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WHEN THERE IS TUMULT - THE OHIO ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND CIVIL
DISTURBANCE CONTROL, 1965 - 1970

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Final report, 15 March 1982

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A thesis submitted to the Ohio State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. AD-A119852	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) <u>When There is Tumult - The Ohio Army</u> <u>National Guard and Civil Disturbance</u> <u>Control. 1965-1970.</u>		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Final Report 15 Mar 1982
7. AUTHOR(s) Paul H. Herbert		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Student HQDA, MILPERCEN (DAPC-OPP-E) 200 Stovall St, Alexandria, VA 22332		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS HQDA, MILPERCEN ATTN: DAPC-OPP-E Same as blk 10		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		12. REPORT DATE 15 Mar 82
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 155
		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) None
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) App'd for public release; dist unlt'd		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Thesis in military history Ohio State University Columbus, Ohio		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Civil disturbance - Riots - Army National Guard - Ohio National Guard - Riot/civil disturbance control - Kent State University, disturbance at in 1970. 		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) <p>THIS REPORT</p> <p>Investigates role of OARNG in civil disturbance control between 1965-1970. Establishes that Guard of officers actively sought performance improvement from Watts (California) riot in 1965; that Guard performance improved steadily thru 1970 as evidenced by</p>		

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Several major incidents; that Federal reform initiatives in 1967 had little practical impact on Guard performance; and that the infamous shooting deaths of four students at Kent State University in 1970 ~~were~~ an aberration attributable to poor military and civilian leadership at the scene rather than any institutional defects within the Guard. Concludes that the Army National Guard was a reliable, effective, and appropriate instrument of civil disturbance control in Ohio between 1965 and 1970.

WHEN THERE IS TUMULT:
THE OHIO ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
AND CIVIL DISTURBANCE CONTROL, 1965-1970

A Thesis

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree Master of Arts

by

Paul H. Herbert, B.S.

The Ohio State University
1982

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Alan R. Mullett
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Department of History

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THESIS ABSTRACT

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL

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NAME: Paul H. Herbert

QUARTER/YEAR: Spring 1982

DEPARTMENT: History

DEGREE: Master of Art

TITLE OF THESIS: When There is Tumult: The Ohio Army National Guard and Civil Disturbance Control, 1965-1970

Summarize in the space below the purpose and principal conclusions of your thesis.

The purpose of this thesis was to investigate the role of the Ohio Army National Guard (OARNG) in civil disturbance control between 1965 and 1970. Prompted by the Watts riot in California and "teen-age" riots in Ohio in the summer of 1965, officers of the OARNG actively sought to improve the Guard's ability to aid civil authorities during disturbances. As a result, Guard performance in civil disturbance control operations steadily improved between 1965 and 1970. When public concern over Guard quality resulted in extensive federal reform initiatives in the wake of the Detroit riots in 1967, the OARNG had already implemented most of the new measures on its own. By the spring of 1968, as evidenced by OARNG performance in the riots following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, the OARNG was a sophisticated and proficient instrument of law enforcement. The OARNG experienced 36 alerts for civil disturbances between 1965 and 1970. In almost all cases in which troops were committed to the streets, they halted disorders and deterred further violence while inflicting no deaths and very few injuries. Against this background, the tragic shooting deaths of 4 students at Kent State University in 1970, for which the OARNG is best known, appear as an aberration attributable to poor leadership by both Guard and civilian officials at the scene. Generally, the OARNG served Ohio well during the turbulent second half of the 1960s.

Allen A. Millett
Adviser's Signature

"When there is tumult, riot, mob, or body of men acting together with intent to commit a felony, or to do or offer violence to person or property, or by force or violence break or resist the laws of the state, the commander in chief may issue a call to the commanding officer of any organization or unit of the organized militia, to order his command or part thereof, describing it, to be and appear, at a time and place therein specified, to act in aid of the civil authorities."

Section 5923.22, Ohio Revised Code

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INTRODUCTION

Increasingly frequent and intense civil disturbances characterized the 1960s in the United States, including Ohio. These disturbances reflected widespread frustration and disaffection with government and society among some groups, notably blacks and college students, and focused primarily on the issues of racial discrimination and the Vietnam War. Moreover, they confronted local and state governments with the dilemma of enforcing the law and protecting life and property on a massive scale without invoking means of violence and repression repulsive to a free society. Among the institutions summoned to the aid of government was the Army National Guard. In Ohio, between 1965 and 1970, the Guard responded to the order of the governor to aid civil authority thirty-six times, a record unparalleled at any other time in the state's history. The Guard's performance in those years and its development of means for rendering assistance as required by the state constitution is an instructive case study in the appropriateness and effectiveness of military organizations in executing the laws in a democracy.

Three things influence the National Guard's ability to develop doctrine for civil disturbance control: the nature of such disturbances, the dual mission of the National Guard and the law. "Civil disturbances" may be loosely defined as temporary disruptions of the public peace by large numbers of persons at one time or place, often attended by acts of violence and lawlessness. Included are riots and other forms of mob activity. The definition may also apply to incidents as varied as labor strikes, political rallies and demonstrations, or acts of terrorism and insurrection. Civil disturbances pose special problems to law enforcement officials and military commanders who may be called upon to deal with them. They often originate in activity which is not unlawful, indeed, which in this country is considered a cherished right. Not all persons present at a disturbance are necessarily participants or law violators. While they may be violent, disturbances are usually the activity of unarmed citizens. Rarely can the mass of participants be characterized as an enemy force in the military sense of those words. At the same time, a single armed participant (and such do appear) can make civil disturbance control a deadly affair.

When a civil disturbance exceeds the capacity of local law enforcement agencies to contain it and the governor summons the state's "organized militia," he is summoning a distinctly military organization. Since 1903, the state

militias have been incorporated into the National Guard of the United States, a component of the armed forces. They thus have a dual mission: on the one hand, to be available to the governor in time of state emergency and on the other to be prepared to become part of the active army upon the order of the President. The latter mission has priority. The Federal government pays nearly all the costs of maintaining the National Guard, and Guard units are not significantly different in organization from their counterparts in the active Army. The presumption of their use in combat dictates their organization, training and equipment. Civil disturbances, however, are not combat. It therefore becomes incumbent upon the Guard, an inherently combat-oriented institution, to develop an appropriate doctrine for bringing its assets to bear in an inherently non-combat situation.

In Ohio, the state Constitution gives to the governor the power "to call forth the militia to execute the laws of the State...and...to suppress insurrection."¹ From this derives the state mission of the Army National Guard: "To provide units organized, equipped and trained to function efficiently at existing strength in the protection of life and property and the preservation of peace, order and the public safety under competent orders of federal and state authorities."² The Constitution and the Ohio Revised Code define legally what the Guard may and may not do during civil disturbance control operations. Only the governor,

as commander-in-chief of the state militia, may summon the Guard. While the state prefers that a request for Guard assistance be submitted by responsible local authority, and only after all lesser means of restoring order have been exhausted, receipt of such a request is not required for the governor to send in troops. He need only determine that riotous conditions exist. The governor may declare martial law, in which case he supplants local government and assumes responsibility for enforcing the law and keeping the peace in a specific geographic area. In such a case, National Guard troops under his command assume most of the powers of civil police. Martial law has never been declared during Ohio's statehood. The governor may also send Guard troops to the aid of civil authority in which case the local civil authority is supreme and may either hold the troops in reserve or assign to the Guard commander specific missions and objectives. The Guard commander determines the means by which these assignments shall be carried out. Troops acting under his command are empowered to enforce reasonable measures incidental to the execution of their mission. This includes the power to detain citizens but not to make arrests or perform other uniquely police duties such as searches or interrogation of suspects. Guardsmen may use their weapons but must adhere to the standard of applying only the minimum force essential to the accomplishment of their mission. They are protected

from prosecution and lawsuit stemming from actions they take under the lawful orders of their superiors.³

The object of civil disturbance control must be to stop and deter unlawful and violent activity by applying the least amount of force or violence possible. The doctrine which the Guard develops must provide for the accomplishment of this object by military organizations within the boundaries set by law. Such doctrine must then be translated into real operational capabilities by a deliberate training program and detailed contingency planning for the support and control of committed forces. Whether the Ohio Army National Guard (OARNG) did these things between 1965 and 1970 is one of two standards for judging whether or not it was proficient at its assigned mission. The other standard, of course, is whether in actual practice the Guard stopped and deterred civil disturbances. The OARNG's proficiency at civil disturbance control between 1965 and 1970 is an important indication of the appropriateness and effectiveness of the Army National Guard for protecting the law and the public safety in time of crisis.

CHAPTER I

Prior to 1964, officers of the OARNG paid little attention to the problems of civil disturbance control. With the exception of a prison riot in 1952, almost 25 years had passed since the last significant call-outs of Ohio troops for a steel strike in Youngstown in 1937 and an auto-workers' strike in Cleveland in 1939. While some Guardsmen of the 1960s undoubtedly recalled those actions and others from the 1920s and 1930s, the experiences which loomed largest in the minds of Guard veterans were the mobilizations for World War II and, less than ten years later, the Korean War. Since Ohio's major Guard unit, the 37th Infantry Division, returned from active duty during the Korean War, crises in Lebanon in 1958, Berlin in 1960 and Cuba in 1962 kept the possibility of future activation for combat foremost in officers' thoughts. They tacitly assumed that the possibility of a civil disturbance mission was remote and that little beyond the annually required few hours training in "riot control" was necessary in way of preparation.

Events of the early 1960s challenged the former assumption. Acting on the precedent set by President Dwight

D. Eisenhower during the Little Rock, Arkansas school integration crisis of 1957, President John F. Kennedy federalized National Guard troops in Mississippi and Alabama in September, 1962, and again in June and September, 1963, to deal with racial disturbances in those states.⁴ Kennedy's actions and the rising tempo of the civil rights movement indicated clearly that Guard activation in a civil disturbance role was more than a remote possibility. On August 22, 1964, senior officers (battalion commanders and above) of the OARNG met at Ft. Hayes in Columbus to discuss contingency plans for civil disturbances in Ohio.

The meeting was little more than a consciousness-raising device. The assembled officers received a briefing and a "pre-printed plan." Most importantly, they learned that the state had been divided into five geographic "task force areas" of responsibility roughly corresponding to the locations of five of the Guard's major units. The commanders of these units became responsible for contingency planning for civil disturbances within their respective areas.⁵ The meeting reflected at once a stronger emphasis on civil disturbance control within the OARNG and, by its brevity, a continued naivete about the problems of civil disturbance operations and the Guard's ability to solve them. The experiences of the Mississippi and Alabama Guard organizations probably prompted this new emphasis. Because they were largely successful operations, they

also reinforced the notion that little more than the ordinary was necessary by way of preparation.⁶ Also in 1964, Guard officers spoke to each of the Ohio Crime Commission's nine law enforcement clinics on the use of the Guard in disaster relief and civil disturbance control, but that was an annual obligation, and again demonstrated the prevalent notion within the OARNG that its plans and preparations were adequate.⁷ That notion would be tested the next summer when Guard troops would respond to two minor disturbances in Ohio. That same summer, in far away Los Angeles, in a neighborhood called Watts, an enraged black citizenry would cause law enforcement officials across the country to re-examine their assumptions about riot control.

The month before Watts, in July, 1965, the OARNG got its first taste of what was to be a major activity over the next five years. By 1965, many American youth were experiencing, as Milton Viorst calls it, "a vague malaise in search of an issue." Their assumptions about social justice and the legitimacy of American institutions were shocked by the Kennedy assassination in 1963 and the intensity of racial hatred and repression evident in the civil rights activities in the south. They admired, perhaps envied, the young blacks of that movement because they had a cause and were demonstrating nobility, idealism, dedication, and self-sacrifice. Perhaps conscription

and the escalation in February and March, 1965, of the smoldering war in Vietnam was, by the summer, even then contributing to a sense of insecurity, apprehension and restlessness among youth.⁸ Whether or not that was so, the restlessness became manifest in two Ohio resort towns on July 3, 1965.

Geneva-on-the-Lake, Ohio, is a small community next to a state park on the shores of Lake Erie midway between Cleveland and the Pennsylvania state line. Russel's Point is a similar community on Indian Lake in east-central Ohio. Both derived much business from summer tourists and both were traditional gathering places for young people on the Fourth of July holiday. On the night of July 3, 1965, each community was host to throngs of youth numbering in the thousands.

At Geneva-on-the-Lake, city officials became concerned that the very large numbers of rowdy youth which packed the bars and jammed the town's one main street would get out of hand. Many young people were drinking heavily and police had stopped several fights and made many arrests. When police attempted to close the bars about 2:00 a.m. on July 4, some of the revelers resisted. Soon, thrown rocks and beer bottles forced the withdrawal of the town's one police cruiser and a mob occupied the main street. Most youngsters simply milled about, but some broke shop windows and taunted police. Almost none responded to police orders

to clear the streets. As the Ashtabula County sheriff had already been called to the scene and had been unable to bring the disturbance under control, he appealed to the governor for National Guard assistance. A very similar course of events, although with less overt resistance to police, led to a similar request from authorities at Russell's Point.

In the case of each community, the governor authorized the use of troops and the Adjutant General mobilized units which arrived in the two towns on the morning of July 4. By that time, the disturbances had subsided and Guard troops were merely a show of force, patrolling the streets and assisting police with traffic direction. These functions were simple enough, and yet the problems encountered, especially during mobilization, clearly indicated that the Guard was not yet ready for any major disturbances.

At Geneva-on-the-Lake, the mayor and sheriff were confused about whom to contact to request Guard assistance. Their first impulse was to go directly to a unit armory in Ashtabula. Fortunately for them, one of the sheriff's deputies was also a Guard officer who informed them of the proper procedures. He also acted as a liaison officer to the Adjutant General and the alerted unit. The Guard preferred to have one of its own officers at the scene of a disturbance to keep the Adjutant General and the designated commander of troops informed of developments

there, and to coordinate actions with the local civil authority until the arrival of troops. Had the Adjutant General had to designate a liaison officer and send him to Geneva-on-the-Lake, delay would have resulted. The presence of the sheriff's deputy on the scene hastened the arrival of the troops. This was a major lesson of the Guard's experience at Geneva-on-the-Lake.⁹

Other matters hindered the alert procedures. The Guard headquarters at Ft. Hayes wisely selected the 1st Battalion, 137th Armor (1-137 Armor) with units in and around Ashtabula for deployment to Geneva-on-the-Lake.¹⁰ However, the duty officer at Columbus sent the order directly to the battalion commander, by-passing the commander of the Northeast Area Task Force who, by the decisions made the previous August, was responsible for Geneva-on-the-Lake.¹¹ In retrospect, this probably speeded rather than delayed the initial deployment of troops, but it is evidence that the procedures which had existed on paper for a year were not clearly understood at all levels. Had it been necessary to reinforce the 1-137 Armor, the oversight might have been costly indeed. The assembly of 1-137 Armor was very slow, probably mostly due to the holiday week-end. Soldiers were still reporting into their armories on July 5. In all, the battalion mustered 18 of its 25 officers and 136 of its approximately 300 enlisted men, figures undoubtedly affected by the fact that "some personnel (mostly recruits)

were not notified due to their tendency to be pugnacious."¹² Probably a wise choice, and one that other commanders would make in future disturbances.

The state headquarters ordered the 1-137 Armor to duty with the stipulation that the mayor "would close all establishments at the resort area where the riot was happening," a stipulation to which Mayor Wilson W. Finley agreed.¹³ The intent was to deprive the rowdy youngsters of intoxicants and shelter so that they would sober up and go home. It was a reasonable tactic. However, once the Governor orders the Guard to aid civil authority, military commanders have no authority, except perhaps in cases clearly and unreasonably endangering their soldiers, to set conditions under which they shall or shall not render assistance. They are subordinate to civil authority and may recommend action but not dictate it. The specifics of civil-military relations during a civil disturbance were apparently unfamiliar to Guard officers of the 1-137 Armor and at the state headquarters, and for that matter to the mayor and sheriff.

When confronted with imminent commitment to a civil disturbance, officers of the 1-137 Armor demonstrated that the tacit assumption of the adequacy of their training on the parts of their superiors was indeed false. Said their Regular Army advisor:

"Battalion and Company officers were not immediately familiar with riot control techniques nor the legal requirements to

be fulfilled prior to their use...These items were hastily reviewed prior to their departure from Ashtabula armory. Additional emphasis has already been called for in these areas and is to be accomplished at unit classes prior to the Labor Day week-end..."¹⁴

Apparently, for the 1-137 Armor at least, motivation to train seriously was directly related to probability of commitment.

Although the "after action reports" and other accounts of the Russell's Point incident are less detailed than those from Geneva-on-the-Lake, there is no reason to assume that the problems encountered there were significantly different. A total of 544 officers and men from the 3d Brigade, 37th Infantry Division, including the brigade headquarters, the 1st Battalion, 166th Infantry (1-166 Infantry) from Columbus, and the 1st Battalion, 147th Infantry (1-147 Infantry) from Cincinnati responded to the alert. En route to Russell's Point, brigade units could only communicate with their headquarters by commercial telephone, and for several minutes one unit could not contact the brigade commander.¹⁵ The infantry units received tear gas grenades and other "riot control agents" dissimilar from those normally issued by the army and which only a few of the officers could use.¹⁶ Fortunately, they were not needed. Lieutenant Colonel Warren E. Nossaman, a Regular Army advisor to the brigade, made perhaps the most perceptive and important observation of the entire operation. Concerning the rifle-bearing young soldiers he saw directing traffic and

on-lookers at Russell's Point, he said,

"...they were not given any specific guidance as to the degree of force they could use in performing their mission. This could have been of crucial importance had it become necessary to use them in quelling a riot like the one that occurred on the night of 3-4 July."¹⁷

The incidents at Geneva-on-the-Lake and Russell's Point demonstrated that civil disturbance control required more sophisticated and thorough preparation than the Guard had yet made. More importantly, they demonstrated that civil disturbances were indeed possible in Ohio. Before these points could be thoroughly digested by Guard officers, events in California provided them with an even greater sense of urgency.

The Watts riot of August 11-17, 1965, is important because it was the first to require National Guard action in a series of ghetto disturbances which swept the nation between 1965 and 1969. It was of a pattern with nine similar disturbances in Ohio over the next four years. Further, the role played by the California National Guard in bringing it to an end influenced the preparations of the Ohio Army National Guard to handle similar disturbances.

Watts was a black ghetto of some fifty square miles near the center of Los Angeles. It had a population of some 650,000 persons. While "nicer" in terms of physical

facilities and housing than the classical inner-city slum dwellings of some other American cities, it bore the hallmarks of black ghettos in America: massive unemployment, exorbitant rents and consumer goods prices, a high crime rate, street gangs, widespread prostitution, gambling and drug abuse. Its populace was socially fragmented, shorn by recent migration of such traditional supports of long-term black communities as the church and the extended family. In 1965, the civil rights movement in the south and the increasingly radical rhetoric of some black activists was awakening a dormant but general hostility among Watts residents toward white society. When police, the most despised symbol of that society, arrested two young black men for drunken driving on the early evening of August 11, and then "roughed up" several members of a crowd which had gathered, the community exploded in violence.¹⁸

The rioting which occurred over the next six days was not in the classic format of a large mob surging down a city street intent on a single act of confrontation or violence. Instead, hundreds of small groups of persons roamed the streets, venting their pent-up rage mostly on business establishments and other symbols of white society. They looted, then burned stores. They assaulted whites who strayed into the neighborhood. They overturned and burned automobiles. They obstructed police and firemen, sometimes meeting them with a hail of stones, bottles and

debris, and sometimes, more ominously, shooting at them from windows and roof-tops. On August 12, the chief of the Los Angeles Police Department informed city and state officials that the police could not control the riot. Later that day, the acting governor authorized the use of the California National Guard. On August 13, elements of the 40th Armor Division arrived in Watts. Before the riot ended on August 17, the Guard deployed some 14,000 troops, all but one battalion of its ground forces, to Los Angeles.

The California Army National Guard was well prepared for the Watts riot both by intent and happy coincidence. The Adjutant General had appointed a member of his staff as a full-time coordinator of civil disturbance contingency plans. Thus the initial alert and deployment of troops was relatively smooth. When the alert went out, several Guard units were just beginning their summer training. These units were already assembled and had plentiful stocks of rations and other supplies necessary for their support for several days. Guard officers, taking their cue from events in Mississippi and Alabama, had thought out the tactics of handling a large disturbance. Their units demonstrated that they were capable of performing the prescribed operations.

These operations fit into a four-phase plan. The first phase was isolation of the disturbance area by establishing a "cordon" of roadblocks and checkpoints around

it and denying both entry and exit to all but those with demonstrable official business. The intent was to prevent rioters from going into undisturbed neighborhoods when control was re-established within the cordon and to prevent outside supporters or merely curious on-lookers from becoming involved. The second phase was to re-establish control within the cordon. This meant sweeping the streets systematically with combined Guard/police formations to disperse rioters until they went home and to arrest the most recalcitrant. The third phase was to maintain the control thus established, which required providing security guards to key facilities and damaged buildings, patrolling the streets to prevent the re-formation of groups of rioters, and insuring that public welfare functions were resumed promptly by providing guards and escorts for fire fighting equipment, ambulances, street crews, gas, power and telephone workers, and so on. The fourth phase was a gradual withdrawal of National Guard troops until only the local police remained.

The operations broadly outlined above entailed a great many specific problems which were identified in California and communicated to Guard officers in Ohio. First among these was the use of deadly force. The California Guard recognized that a riot in an American city, however dangerous, is not a combat situation and that the indiscriminate use of firepower against civilians is unacceptable. As a

control measure, only non-commissioned officer squad leaders received ammunition initially. As the Guard encountered sniper fire, however, the commander of troops ordered that all of his soldiers be issued ammunition. When large bodies of soldiers are together and under the control of their officers, as when they are clearing streets, this is still not necessarily dangerous. When they are dispersed, however, as when on patrol, sentry duty or manning an isolated road-block, they feel less secure, are under the the control of younger, less experienced leaders and are more likely to use their weapons. At least one unarmed civilian was shot and killed by Guardsmen when he tried to run their road-block in an automobile. Intensive training, especially of junior leaders, is required to avoid such incidents.

The California Guard further recognized the inherent inappropriateness of its weapons. Guard units brought .30-caliber machine guns to Watts and used them against snipers on two occasions. Later, Guard officers recognized that the potential for provocation and panic inherent in the presence and use of such weapons was not worth their limited utility in countering snipers. Finally, Guard officers lamented the necessity of using the soldiers' individual weapons, mostly M-1, .30-caliber rifles and M-2 carbines of World War II vintage. These weapons fired ball ammunition and were accurate and lethal at ranges out to

1,000 yards. Their bullets easily penetrated most residential wall material at close range and ricocheted from any hard object. They were very dangerous for use on city streets. Guard officers would have preferred shotguns, such as the police carried, especially for patrolling and road-blocks. They concluded that the bayoneted rifle was the most effective weapon for clearing streets, largely due to its psychological impact when used by mass formations.

Thorough liaison with the Los Angeles Police Department also characterized Guard operations at Watts. The Guard commander of troops and the senior police officer established a joint command post where both agencies had access to all reports and both had a voice in all tactical decisions. Guardsmen who were also police officers stayed with their police organizations as liaison officers. Patrols of the cordoned area consisted of Guardsmen and police. Thus each patrol combined the manpower of the Guard (usually five to ten armed men) with the experience and legal expertise of the police. Each patrol could make arrests if necessary. Police radios were found to be far superior to the Guard's tactical radios for use among buildings: joint patrolling thus insured communication.

Lastly, the Watts riot starkly demonstrated that, at least from the individual soldier's perspective, the line between combat and law enforcement is not always clear. Guardsmen confronted thousands of people in groups in which

the innocent mingled with the criminal and the murderous. Police confiscated numerous firearms, some home-made. Two policemen and a fireman died in the performance of their duties. By the end of the disturbance, another thirty-one persons were dead.¹⁹ The riot captured headlines world-wide for days. It could not have been ignored by responsible Guard officers anywhere in the United States.

By August, 1965, then, officers of the OARNG had sufficient reason to believe that civil disturbances were complex and dangerous incidents which could happen in Ohio and which would require thorough preparation.²⁰ They had a wealth of information from the experiences of the California National Guard upon which to base that preparation. They rightfully perceived that the first step had to be establishing closer links with local civil authorities and especially in urban and recreational areas where disturbances were thought likely to occur. Also reacting to the specter of Watts, city and police officials across the state agreed.

On August 27, 1965, Major General Erwin C. Hostetler, Adjutant General of Ohio, directed that the five task force area commanders assign liaison officers (LNOs) from their staffs to fourteen Ohio communities.²¹ The LNOs were to schedule meetings with city officials as soon as possible to discuss civil disturbance contingencies. Over the next

two years, this program expanded until each Ohio city with a population of 25,000 or more had a permanent LNO from the OARNG.²² The LNO's job was to update joint plans monthly and be immediately available to police headquarters in the event of a disturbance. Senior Guard commanders attended each of the initial LNO meetings with city officials in August and September, 1965. These meetings identified potential problems and possible solutions in civil disturbance control and began a continuing dialogue between civil and military officials throughout Ohio.

Of central concern to civil authorities during these meetings were the procedures for summoning OARNG assistance.²³ Geneva-on-the-Lake had demonstrated that such procedures were not well understood. As explained by Guard officers, only the Governor could commit the Guard to the aid of civil authorities. Therefore, his office should be notified directly when Guard troops were needed. Such notification should be followed by a written request from the mayor, county sheriff or other responsible official. The request should state that conditions were beyond the capabilities of local law enforcement agencies to control. The Governor would issue a proclamation asserting that riotous conditions existed and would order the Adjutant General to send troops to the aid of the local authorities. Both the Governor's proclamation and the "Riot Act," a formal order to disperse, were to be read to those engaged in the disturbance prior

to the actual commitment of troops. While none of these measures were specifically required by law, compliance with them would establish for the record that the commitment of troops was within the authority given the governor by the Ohio Revised Code and was not simply due to the caprice of a willful mayor or sheriff.

Because these procedures are necessarily time consuming and because the alert, assembly and deployment of troops takes even more time, some civilian officials expressed the concern that a riot or disturbance could be completely out of control by the time troops arrived. They preferred having the troops assemble and stand by at the first sign of an impending disturbance.²⁴ This was unacceptable for several reasons. First and most important, the law gave the governor the power to send in the militia whenever there was "tumult, riot, mob or body of men acting together" with criminal intent, that is, a riot in progress. Deployment of the Guard as a preventive measure before any riot occurred was thus legally questionable. Requiring civil authority to declare that their own law enforcement capabilities had been exceeded was a practical means of insuring that the Guard would be committed only under lawful circumstances and that a minor disturbance could not be used as a pretext for establishing martial rule.²⁵ It also spread the responsibility for making the decision to commit troops among local and state officials, a matter of

no small political importance.

Even had preventive deployment of the Guard been lawful, there were practical objections. Assembly of Guardsmen for state active duty required that they be paid by the state, not the Federal government. At \$6.00 per man per day, added to the costs of food, transportation and billeting, the activation of even one battalion could be very expensive. At the same time, the pay did not even approximate compensation of many Guardsmen for time lost from their civilian jobs. Repetitious and unnecessary activations were likely to hurt morale and recruiting and disrupted Guardsmen's family lives and civilian occupations. Finally, the precipitous deployment of troops to those situations which might spawn a disturbance, such as demonstrations or crowded recreational areas, would be an unpopular act of repression likely to provoke rather than inhibit incidents.

For these reasons, the Guard could not provide troops on a stand-by basis. The Guard could insure that the mobilization, once ordered, was efficient and fast. A first step toward this goal fulfilled at the initial LNO meetings was the clarification of requesting procedures just discussed. A second major step was the assignment of an LNO to the local police department, a step enthusiastically received by local officials.²⁶ This officer could notify the Adjutant General and the appropriate task force area

commander that a disturbance was taking place and that local officials were contemplating a request for troops. He could provide much important information first-hand, such as the type and location of the disturbance. He could make arrangements on the spot for the arrival of the troops, such as providing for a police escort of the military convoy and selecting a secure dismount site. Most importantly, he could coordinate local contingency plans for a civil disturbance with those of the appropriate National Guard units before a disturbance occurred.²⁷

A third major step toward speeding Guard deployment which was discussed in detail at the meetings was the aforementioned organization of the state into task force areas. Since 1964, task force area commanders had had operational control for civil disturbance purposes of each OARNG unit within their areas regardless of the location of those units' parent headquarters.²⁸ They could thus select on the basis of type and proximity the best units to deploy to each city and could assign contingency missions accordingly. Plans could be prepared jointly through the LNO. Sheriffs, mayors and city police could meet with their counterpart company and battalion commanders and staffs. The task force area staff (i.e., the staff of the senior commander in the area, who was the task force commander as an additional duty) could prepare a rational and prioritized scheme for reinforcement within the area

in the event of intense or multiple disturbances. All of these measures facilitated communication between civil and military leaders with consequent gains in mutual understanding and confidence.

The meetings held throughout Ohio in response to Major General Hostetler's letter were not the first efforts by the National Guard to establish effective liaison with local civil authority. At least one task force area commander had been conducting similar meetings on his own since the previous year and at least three Ohio cities had begun their own civil disturbance contingency planning.²⁹ But the meetings held in August and September, 1965, in direct response to the incidents at Geneva-on-the-Lake and Russell's Point and in California, formally established the LNO system on a permanent basis and integrated it with the task force area commands. Local civil authorities were now formally linked to the OARNG command system.

The experiences of the California Army National Guard served as a model for planning in Ohio. Guard officers and civilian officials discussed them at the LNO meetings in September.³⁰ Forty officers of the OARNG, including all of its general officers and many who were to hold influential command and staff positions over the next several years, attended the annual conference of the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) on September 29, 1965, where they listened to a detailed briefing on the

Watts operations by two of the California Guard's general officers.³¹ The California Guard later produced a training film for civil disturbance control based on its Watts experiences which the OARNG obtained and used for training soldiers and leaders for at least the next two years.³² An OARNG officer made explicit reference to Watts when he explained in an article why certain operations were performed at the Cleveland riots in 1966.³³ This focus on Watts as the paradigm for the civil disturbance threat enhanced the OARNG's ability to respond to similar disturbances in Ohio through 1970. It also raised three issues which were to affect the OARNG throughout the decade.

First of these was the use of deadly force. At Watts, the classical advancing line of bayonets had been met with bullets and the nature of the civil disturbance control problem had changed. Combat and law enforcement merged. The response of Guard officers, who are essentially combat officers, was to meet fire with fire, literally, and to arm all of their men with loaded weapons so that they could protect themselves. Indeed, to send a soldier into a situation in which he is likely to become a target without arming him, aside from the moral issue, is to risk major morale and disciplinary problems. In Ohio, Guard officers developed the notion that Guardsmen performing civil disturbance control duties incur the same risks as a police officer on the beat and thus should have the same protection,

that is, a loaded weapon.³⁴ But Guardsmen are soldiers, and when soldiers load their weapons they acquire considerably more "protection" than the police officer derives from his holstered service revolver, a point recognized by California Guard officers in the aftermath of Watts. Nor does the young Guardsman bring to the streets the same training and experience that a police officer does. The problem became one of developing the techniques by which the Guard's military manpower, organization and discipline could be selectively applied to civil disturbance situations without unnecessarily endangering either unarmed civilians or the soldiers themselves.

The second issue was that the Watts experience, reinforced by OARNG experience in several Ohio cities over the next few years, dictated to the Guard the expected nature of civil disturbances practically to the exclusion of all other possibilities. No shots were fired at Geneva-on-the-Lake or Russell's Point. Because many shots had been fired at Watts, it became the "worst case" situation for which the OARNG necessarily had to prepare. After Watts, Guardsmen tended not to think in terms of labor strikes or other disorders, but in terms of violent upheavals in black ghetto neighborhoods of big cities.³⁵ And that is precisely what they encountered through 1969. However, not all of the assumptions which were valid for ghetto riots were necessarily valid for other types of disturbances.

Finally, in considering Watts the OARNG could not avoid the issue of race. Guard officers vehemently denied that the Guard was a segregated or racist institution and in fact it was not, at least not intentionally so, an issue which shall be discussed. Blacks were represented in all ranks including field grade officers in the state headquarters. However, their numbers were very few indeed. The OARNG was in effect an almost wholly Caucasian organization and as such was vulnerable to being perceived as a brute instrument of white oppression. Lieutenant Colonel Lovel Tipton, Jr., a black officer who was assistant G-3 for training from 1954 to 1967 asserts that such a perception is wholly false. Nevertheless, Federal officials were to become especially sensitive to this vulnerability. The issue was to have its effect on both the Guard's civil-military relations and its relationship with the National Guard Bureau in Washington.³⁶

CHAPTER II

Between September, 1965, when so much of the Guard's attention focused on the civil disturbance mission, and July, 1966, there were no civil disturbances requiring Guard action in Ohio. Few indeed will take to the streets during an Ohio winter. This pattern persisted through 1970. During the interlude, the LNOs worked on their contingency plans with their respective police departments. The Adjutant General ordered an additional one-day training assembly for junior leaders on their duties during civil disturbances.³⁷ Meanwhile, beginning in November, 1965, for reasons unrelated to civil disturbances, two major elements of the OARNG, the 107th Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 3d Brigade, 37th Infantry Division, plus several smaller units, began earnest training and preparation for their incorporation into the Select Reserve Force, a composite of reserve and Guard units designated by the Pentagon to be brought to a state of readiness equivalent to active Army units.³⁸

The disturbances which erupted in the summer of 1966 conformed to the "Watts model" and thus provided the Guard with an opportunity to gauge the effectiveness of its initiatives. The first occurred in Cleveland, in a black

neighborhood of some 100,000 persons called Hough on the East Side, on the night of July 18, 1966. It is not apparent what incident sparked the riot. One account cites the refusal of a white tavern owner to provide free ice-water to a black customer. Whatever it was, it triggered an explosion of pent-up frustration throughout the community which soon exhibited the characteristics of the Watts riot: lack of central focus, widespread looting and burning of white business establishments, scattered violence, and occasional gunshots.

Although the Cleveland Police Department had the Hough district under control by the early morning of July 19, police officers rightfully feared that the disorders would continue that night. Of particular concern was the burning: ten buildings had been destroyed by fire in the first night. Mayor Ralph S. Locher therefore requested that Governor James Rhodes send in the Guard. The first elements of the 107th Armored Cavalry Regiment, under the command of Colonel Robert H. Canterbury, arrived in the early evening.

The activities of the Guard on July 19 indicate that the Guard's alert procedures had improved since Geneva-on-the-Lake. The police department notified its Guard counterparts of a possible request for assistance early that morning and by 7:15 a.m. Colonel Canterbury had received a warning order from the Adjutant General. He immediately dispatched a staff officer, Major Calvin C. Lanning, to

police headquarters to act as LNO. At 9:00 a.m. Colonel Canterbury met with Major General Hostetler and officers of the state staff. They made detailed plans for the support of committed troops. These included plans for feeding the troops and fuelling their vehicles regularly. As the 107th Armored Cavalry Regiment had loaned many of its wheeled-vehicles to the 3d Brigade, 37th Infantry Division, which was at annual field training at Camp Grayling, Michigan, the staff tasked other OARNG units to support the 107th Cavalry with transportation. The 2d Battalion, 145th Infantry from Akron and surrounding communities received a warning order to be prepared to reinforce the 107th Cavalry. The staff provided the mayor of Akron with the telephone numbers for the state headquarters so that he could be included in any decision to move the 2-145 Infantry. Staff officers made arrangements for delivery of ammunition from its storage site at Camp Perry to the armories designated as assembly points. The Lake Chemical Company of Ashtabula was alerted to the possibility of the Guard having to make purchases of chemical munitions on a 24-hour basis. The state packet of riot control equipment was moved from Camp Perry to an armory in Cleveland.³⁹ When the Governor ordered Guard troops to active duty in Cleveland, everything was in place except the actual assembly and deployment of troops.

The initial contingent of troops deployed smoothly from their armories to the riot area. From the beginning,

Guardsmen patrolled jointly with the Cleveland police. Some patrolled the streets bordering the riot area and manned road-blocks in an effort to isolate the riot area. Others patrolled assigned sectors of the cordoned area while still others accompanied squad cars responding to specific emergencies. Troops accompanied fire fighting units and guarded fire stations. While most of this activity was properly executed, it did not restore order. Rioting continued throughout the disturbed area and especially at night until Saturday, July 23. Saturday and Sunday nights were relatively quiet, probably reflecting the mayor's decision to impose a curfew for teen-agers, but on Sunday arsonists set fire simultaneously to six abandoned houses in different parts of the neighborhood. A hard rain on Monday, July 25, brought the first truly quiet day and night, and on Tuesday the Guard began a phased withdrawal from Hough.⁴⁰

The Guard failed to establish a tight cordon of the riot area and the consequences were tragic. A cordon requires that all routes in and out of a disturbed area be manned on a 24-hour basis. Entry and exit should be allowed only at selected points and/or times and then every effort should be made to control who comes and goes. Even granting that no cordon can be completely effective, a visible effort acts as a deterrent. The Guard at Hough had insufficient troops to establish such a cordon and conduct other necessary operations. Also, a cordon would have

interrupted two major intra-city thoroughfares, an inconvenience the mayor was apparently unwilling to impose.⁴¹ The Guard instead manned a few selected intersections and patrolled the streets between these points in hopes of inhibiting free movement in and out of the riot area. There were reports of small groups of black youths creating disturbances in neighborhoods adjacent to Hough, which suggest that the cordon was less than ideally effective. Much more damning of the cordon effort is the fact that on two separate occasions, blacks inside the cordon and who were apparently not involved with the rioting were murdered by heavily armed white vigilante groups who drove into the riot area from outside the cordon.⁴²

Another tragic episode bears evidence that not all Guardsmen were yet as expert as they needed to be. Early Thursday morning, July 21, police and Guardsmen were manning temporary road-blocks around a burning roller rink. At one of these, a police officer halted an automobile which was headed away from the fire. Some sort of argument took place between the driver and the police officer after which the automobile appeared to be moving away. Someone ordered the soldiers to stop the car, to shoot at it. This they did and the car stopped. The driver was not injured, but his wife and seven-year-old son were severely wounded and his infant child had been hit. The family was black. They were unarmed. A stray bullet, apparently a ricochet,

also wounded a Guard officer at the scene.⁴³

Certainly in almost all cases rifle fire is an inappropriate means of halting a fleeing suspect, whatever the dangers inherent in making an arrest may be. It was especially inappropriate to this case where there was no immediate linkage of the suspect to a crime, and where innocent lives were so obviously endangered. The incident raises uncomfortable questions about racial attitudes among Guardsmen. It also reflects the stage of development of the OARNG's policy toward the use of deadly force. Guardsmen carried loaded weapons from the outset. Supposedly, they were "under orders not to fire unless fired upon and then only upon the direct order of an NCO or Guard officer with each group."⁴⁴ Clearly those orders were violated in this case. The Guardsmen had not been fired upon and it was very unclear who gave the order to fire. One must wonder what the result would have been had the Guardsmen at the roadblock been armed with .30-caliber machine guns as were many of their comrades at Cleveland.⁴⁵ The Guard's policy on the use of deadly force at Cleveland as quoted above was tolerable. Its assurance that that policy would be followed was deficient in at least this one instance because the soldiers did not wait for clear, explicit orders from a superior and because the officer present did not insure that Guard policy was properly executed. The result was worse than it needed to be because the Guardsmen were armed

with weapons inappropriate to their mission. Shotgun fire, had all else failed, probably would have caused the driver to stop without penetrating the body of the vehicle.

Lastly, it appears that the Guard did not apply to the Hough riots a coherent plan for bringing the disturbance to an end. A tight cordon, systematic sweeping of the streets to disperse looters, and firm control of the areas thus cleared by sentries and patrols, as applied at Watts, might have been much more effective. Instead, the Guard applied a loose cordon and reinforced police and fire units responding to emergencies within the riot area. This was a strategy of reaction rather than action and it did not work well. Fatigue on the part of the rioters and a hard rain ended the disturbance, not the National Guard.

Wholesale condemnation of the Guard's efforts at Hough, however, is unwarranted. One must recall that this was the OARNG's first major civil disturbance operation in many years. The alert and deployment were quick and well-organized, reflecting the efforts of Guard and police planners over the past year. The critical principle of joint command and operations between the Guard and police was observed. When the second of the vigilante murders occurred in the early hours of Saturday, July 23, the Guardsmen of a joint patrol near the scene played a key role in disarming and apprehending the alleged killers. If the Guardsmen who fired at the automobile acted improperly, they were the

exceptional case. There were 2,215 Guardsmen at Hough, almost all of whom were armed. While there is little evidence to show that any of them were in fact shot at, they certainly believed themselves to be in danger and, given the vigilante murders, not unreasonably so. That the unfortunate family at the road-block were the only persons injured by Guard action is evidence that the vast majority of Guardsmen acted with caution and restraint. Underscoring this point is the fact that on two separate occasions during the riot, black community leaders, including two members of the Cleveland City Council, requested that Mayor Locher appeal to the Governor to declare martial law in Hough and turn matters entirely over to the Guard.⁴⁶ The vigilante murders indicate how perilously close to racial war the riot came; that it was not much worse is attributable to the National Guard.

The absence of a single, coherent plan at Hough reflects some of the problems of civil-military relations during a disturbance more than it does incompetence on the part of the Guard. The Guard was acting in support of civil authority. Therefore, responsibility for deciding what the Guard was to do rested with Mayor Locher. Certainly Guard officers shared this responsibility to the degree that they advised the mayor and actually conducted operations. At Hough, the mayor had the advice of both Colonel Canterbury, the commander of troops, and Major General Hostetler, the

Adjutant General, the latter of whom was empowered by the Governor to order as many troops as necessary to the scene. Therefore, the absence of sufficient troops to man the cordon must be seen as a conscious choice and not an inability to bring more troops into the operation. Guard operations at Hough can accordingly be seen as an effort to make maximum use of available manpower given that there was not enough manpower to properly isolate the disturbance area and gain control within it.

This choice was most probably Locher's. He had been reluctant to request Guard assistance in the first place and reluctant to reinforce the 107th Cavalry with the 2-145 Infantry on July 20. Such reluctance is understandable. Justly or unjustly, a major riot in a city does not reflect credit on the incumbent administration. When that administration calls in large numbers of troops, it at once admits that the disturbance is indeed major and further that it is incapable of controlling the situation with its own resources. If troops are requested too soon, the administration appears as a repressive (in this case, racist) regime: too late, and it appears weak and indecisive. No matter what happens, elected officials will have to answer to the voters and the political opposition. They therefore "naturally" incline toward the incompatible goals of ending a disturbance in the least possible amount of time with the least possible commitment

of outside help.⁴⁷ Requesting martial law, which surrenders political control entirely, is normally out of the question. Only when civilian officials began to perceive that an extended period of disorder was a greater political liability than a one-time massive commitment of troops did they find a basis for real cooperation with the Guard.

When rioting broke out in the black community in Dayton on August 31, 1966, and officials recorded twenty-five injuries and 130 arrests on the first night, Mayor David Hall promptly requested Guard assistance. Perhaps he had taken a lesson from Cleveland. By early afternoon on September 1, 1,142 Guardsmen of the 371st Artillery Group (Air Defense) commanded by Colonel James C. Clem, were on the streets. Employing the standard tactics of a cordon, systematic clearance of the streets, and security through stationary entries and roving patrols, all done jointly with the city police, the Guard brought relative calm to the neighborhood in less than 24 hours. Although Guardsmen remained on the scene until September 7, there were no major incidents after the first twenty-four hours of operations. No one was killed or injured by Guard action.

The reasons for the difference in the two operations, aside from the fact that the neighborhood in Dayton was smaller in both area and population, were first that the civil authority in Dayton was more decisive than that in

Cleveland, and second that the Guard commander at Dayton had studied the Cleveland experience closely and was able to avoid some of the problems encountered there.

Mayor Hall's early morning request for troops on September 1 after a night of disorder resulted in arrival of the Guard that afternoon, before the cycle of calm by day and violence by night could be repeated. Guardsmen were able to reconnoiter their assigned posts by daylight. By nightfall, they were in place and ready to respond to any outbreak of disorder. Perhaps more importantly, their deployment in daylight was easily visible to neighborhood residents who could be either reassured or intimidated according to their sentiment. Although Hall "hesitated" at first, according to the Guard after-action report, he declared a curfew of 10:30 p.m. for all minors in the riot area beginning Thursday and lasting until further notice. The curfew was an important instrument of control because it allowed the police to clear the streets of youth at night without having first to witness disorderly activity on their part. OARNG officers usually preferred to have curfews implemented; significantly, Mayor Locher had not imposed one at Cleveland until the sixth day of rioting. Decisiveness and a willingness to cooperate fully with the Guard once it was committed marked Hall's conduct and contributed directly to the early restoration of order and the low number of casualties.⁴⁸

Colonel Clem's leadership was another important contribution. As commander of the 371st Group, he was also commander of Task Force Area Southwest, which included Dayton. Thus the same man who held primary responsibility for contingency planning in Dayton became commander of troops there. During the Hough riots, Colonel Clem had been at the state headquarters monitoring the reports which were sent there. He and Colonel Canterbury were friends and discussed the problems of the Hough riots in detail afterwards. Clem passed this information on to his staff and LNOs who discussed it with their counterparts in the various police departments. The experience of the Guard at Cleveland translated into better preparedness of the Guard for Dayton.⁴⁹

Colonel Clem went to Dayton personally as soon as the LNO there notified state headquarters of the mayor's decision to request troops. He visited the riot area with police officials, then travelled to each of the armories where his subordinate commanders were assembling their troops and gave them specific missions and instructions. His primary concerns were for officer control of operations and restraint. He spoke briefly with each contingent of soldiers, reminding them of the special need for discipline and caution. He insured that battalions and batteries were not given multiple missions beyond the capacities of their leaders to supervise: one unit was solely responsible for providing guards to the fire departments, another for

the cordon and so on. He carried the principle of joint patrolling with police a step further by insisting that to the extent possible every formation of Guardsmen be accompanied by at least one police officer. He harped on personal appearance and military bearing of soldiers and officers, and by exhortation and example made his officers and NCO's "over-supervise" all details of operations on the streets.⁵⁰ He implemented a system of rotating units regularly between duty on the street, ready reserve and second reserve so that every soldier was allowed sufficient rest. Photographs of the Guard at Dayton show soldiers who generally bear all the traditional hallmarks of well-disciplined troops: neat appearances, uniformity of clothing and equipment, presence of non-commissioned officers supervising activities, weapons properly carried and equipment which appears to be properly maintained.⁵¹

Colonel Clem's instructions on the use of deadly force at Dayton were more detailed than those issued at Cleveland, but in some ways were not as adequate. His soldiers carried loaded weapons but were ordered not to chamber a round, that is, not to feed the first round of the clip or magazine into the breech. By thus requiring a very deliberate action to cock or charge the weapon before it could be fired, these instructions reduced the chances of accidental or hasty discharge. Clem also ordered that soldiers fire only single, aimed shots. If fired upon, his soldiers were

"to shoot to kill." Looters were to be ordered to halt, ordered again together with a warning shot, and, if they persisted, shot. Whether the soldier in such a case was to shoot to kill, wound or frighten was not clear. These instructions differed from those issued at Cleveland in two important respects. First, soldiers were now allowed to shoot under conditions other than only when fired upon, i.e., they could shoot looters. Also, there was no repetition of the caveat that a soldier could shoot only when so ordered by a Guard officer or NCO. Perhaps the latter rule was so basic that it was assumed, but it seems that it would bear repeating in light of Clem's meticulous attention to detail in all other respects. In any case, Guardsmen at Dayton shot no one because they gained control of the disturbed neighborhood very early and because they were very closely supervised by their leaders. The differences between Clem's instructions and Canterbury's are important because they show that the OARNG had not yet developed a uniform policy for the application of deadly force during civil disturbance control operations.⁵²

The Guard's experience at Dayton had political significance also. Its presence in the city coincided with a visit there by President Lyndon B. Johnson, who was on a campaign swing through the Mid-west to support Democratic candidates for the House and Senate. The trip afforded him an important opportunity to speak out on his domestic

policies and the war in Vietnam.⁵³ He had appealed to the public in one of his speeches, pleading that citizens act to stop the violence that was rending American cities. Earlier, a remark by Vice-President Hubert H. Humphrey during the Hough riots had been taken by critics of the administration as encouragement to rioters.⁵⁴ Neither Johnson nor Humphrey had mentioned the preservation of law and order nor had they condemned the rioters. They thus represented the emerging position of the Democratic Party that the solution to civil disturbances would be found in patience and aggressive attention to those social conditions which spawned disturbances.

In Ohio, Governor Rhodes seemed by his actions to represent the also emerging position of the Republicans, i.e., that rioting was a clear and inexcusable violation of law and would be stopped by force if necessary before any consideration of social relief measures would be made. During both the Hough and Dayton disturbances, Rhodes had not hesitated to send in troops as soon as requested, but thereafter remained curiously aloof from the events. He avoided both personal involvement and public comment. Invited to accompany the President on his trip through Ohio, Rhodes was conspicuous by his reticence. If his position was that riots were collective crimes quite possibly ignited by revolutionary conspirators; that they are not indicative of any general societal ills requiring

intervention by levels of government higher than those immediately confronted with them; that force should be met with force; and that the Democrats are fundamentally wrong in their approach to the problem, then these actions on his part were certainly consistent with that position. The evidence is only circumstantial and yet it is not too much to believe that the National Guard remained in Dayton until September 7, a full five days after they had brought order to the city, as a symbolic challenge from a Republican governor to a Democratic president. Their message could well have been that only through such measures can general order be restored to American cities. This aspect of Guard operations in Dayton points up that civil disturbance control always has a political dimension which can be sufficiently powerful to determine even the length of a unit's deployment.

The OARNG's experiences at Cleveland and Dayton convinced its officers that civil disturbance control was a serious mission requiring full-time attention. The Adjutant General added a nine-hour block of instruction on civil disturbance control to the twenty-four hours required annually for all personnel by Army training guidance. Acting on a recommendation from Clem, the Chief of Administrative Services of the OARNG established several public information teams to assist task force commanders with media relations during disturbances. In the spring of 1967, the OARNG's

intelligence section began regular meetings with the local office of the Army's military intelligence effort in Ohio. Intelligence officers of the OARNG, the Army and the Ohio State Highway Patrol exchanged information on situations which carried, in their view, high potential for sparking a disturbance. Not least of these were the visits by Dr. Martin Luther King and Stokely Carmichael to Cleveland and Cincinnati respectively in April, 1967. Guard intelligence efforts were not concentrated on blacks exclusively. Between March and July, 1967, OARNG "observers" monitored a motorcycle gang rally in Bucyrus, a United Auto Workers' strike in Mansfield, a steel workers' strike in Mt. Vernon, and a labor dispute in Crestline.⁵⁵

Operationally, the experiences of Cleveland and Dayton confirmed the Guard's emphasis on the LNO system and its use of the "Watts model" as the basis for tactical training. A memo from the Assistant Adjutant General (Army) to Major General Hostetler on "lessons learned" in 1966 listed nothing that would have surprised the California National Guard. The OARNG's doctrine for civil disturbance control incorporated and refined the Watts tactics and was based on the principles of prior planning, civil-military cooperation and "prompt, decisive application of military power."⁵⁶

Another interesting response of the OARNG to its experiences in 1966 was an effort to alter the laws which

constrained its activities during a disturbance. The state Judge Advocate General recommended to Major General Hostetler four modifications to Section 5923.21 of the Ohio Revised Code. These would have given the Guard sweeping and unprecedented powers. The recommended modifications included allowing someone other than the governor exclusively to order out the Guard should the governor be temporarily absent; granting the Guard independence in some matters from the local authority it was sent to support; granting the Guard authority to temporarily govern civilian communities without a declaration of martial law; and granting Guardsmen limited protection from prosecution and civil suit arising out of their actions during a civil disturbance.⁵⁷ Some of these initiatives would be acted upon by the legislature in the fall of 1967 and the wake of events in Detroit. They represent the Guard's growing concern with the complexities of civil disturbance control.

There can be little question that the OARNG was better at civil disturbance control by the summer of 1967 than it had ever been. It possessed an effective although unwritten civil disturbance doctrine that called for quick deployment, integration with local police organizations, restrained use of deadly force, and tactics designed to yield physical control of a given urban area quickly. It had created institutions such as the LNO system and the task force area commands to facilitate its civil disturbance control efforts.

It had detailed plans for most Ohio cities. It had expended much effort on establishing and maintaining communication with civilian officials. It had implemented a training program to insure that its members were properly prepared for their peculiar roles. Five of its battalions had first-hand experience in relatively successful civil disturbance control operations. Its leaders had shown a commendable willingness to analyze their experiences critically and share their conclusions with other Guard officers. Its intelligence efforts indicate that it aggressively sought out information that would enhance its ability to respond appropriately to future disturbances. All of these accomplishments were in addition to the Guard's normal training for its federal mission and thus represented considerable sacrifice of personal time and convenience on the parts of many Guardsmen. By the summer of 1967, the OARNG was a fairly sophisticated instrument of civil disturbance control.

CHAPTER III

1967 was an important year for the OARNG because it brought massive federal intervention into the civil disturbance control planning process as a direct result of Watts-model riots in Detroit, Michigan, and Newark, New Jersey. Also, it saw the reorganization of the entire National Guard along lines long planned by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and much disputed by the Guard itself. These two events were of greater importance to the OARNG than operations within Ohio, which were not dissimilar in any significant respect from those of the previous year.

In July, 1967, rioting swept the black neighborhoods of Detroit and Newark. The scale and intensity in both cases rivalled Watts and in both cases National Guard performance was controversial to say the least. In New Jersey, Guardsmen joined police in a house-to-house search for weapons which, in fact, became a wholesale ransack of private homes. In Detroit, 8,000 Guardsmen with very little special civil disturbance training were yanked out of their summer maneuvers and thrown willy-nilly on to the streets, many of them without complete uniforms and separated from their parent units. Their response was jittery at best. They

fired at snipers, street lights, shadows and each other. They indiscriminately blasted away at suspected sniper positions with the heavy machine guns on their tanks. Within forty-eight hours the situation was so completely out of control that Governor George Romney, a Republican front-runner for the presidential nomination, appealed to the Democratic administration for help. Before the rioting stopped, thirty-nine persons were dead, the Michigan Army National Guard was federalized under the command of a regular Army lieutenant general, and some 4,000 troops of the Army's elite 101st and 82d Airborne Divisions were patrolling the streets of Detroit.⁵⁸

The Detroit and Newark riots shocked the nation. Combined with the vitriolic rhetoric of Black Power advocates such as H. Rap Brown and the increasing tempo of civil disturbances nationwide, the events seemed to herald the advent of the unthinkable: race war in America. The public outcry over the two events included some of the most scathing criticism of the National Guard in its history. Newsweek magazine called the Guard "a ragtag army" and criticized the quality of its leaders. It said that Guard enlisted men used their service as "a social club or their own version of the middle class collegians' draft deferment."⁵⁹ Time called the Guard's performance at Detroit "appalling," which in a later edition the magazine attributed to "their inexperience, ineptitude and lack of equipment," characteristics which reinforced "the popular

image of the Weekend warrior."⁶⁰ Responsible officials made vague implications that responsibility lay elsewhere.

Governor Romney was quoted as saying, "We knew we couldn't depend on the Guard. That's why we asked for the army," an incredible admission from a commander-in-chief unless meant to reflect discredit upon the Democratic administration's handling of defense policy and reserve readiness. Governor Richard J. Hughes of New Jersey was more to the point when he called attention to the profound differences between riot control and the conventional warfare for which the Guard is necessarily trained. Still, his Adjutant General, Major General James F. Cantwell, attributed the New Jersey Guard's problems to the inappropriateness "of the currently prescribed training, tactics and techniques," as if federal training guidance could account for the poor discipline and leadership in the New Jersey Guard.⁶¹ The problem in New Jersey, after all, had been the Guard's inability to carry out any tactics or techniques, let alone those which might have been appropriate.

There was some justice to these allegations, of course. The Guard's primary mission was a wartime one. Its training was prescribed by the Continental Army Command of the active Army and was monitored in each unit by regular Army advisors. That training called for only twenty-four hours of riot control out of a total annual unit training cycle of some 280 hours.⁶² Guard officers had "commander's

time," that is, blocks of time within certain training periods where the commander could prescribe his own training according to the needs of his unit. These periods were not generously provided throughout the year, however, and most commanders had a variety of needs competing for the available time. Federal control, therefore, did inhibit extensive training for purely local missions. As so aptly demonstrated in Ohio, it did not preclude such training, especially where Guard leaders possessed foresight, aggressiveness and a willingness to make personal sacrifices. Still, the public outcry over the Guard was national with scant recognition of any differences in Guard quality between states. Only the Federal government, working through the National Guard Bureau of the Departments of the Army and Air Force, and the Continental Army Command, had the ability to induce change in the Guard as a whole. Thus, both politically and institutionally, the focus for reform was the Federal government.

President Johnson was quick to respond to the clamor for reform. Close on the heels of the Detroit tragedy he established the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (NACCD), a bipartisan body headed by Republican Governor Otto Kerner of Illinois and commonly referred to as the Kerner Commission. The President tasked the Commission with investigating all aspects of the recent disturbances and with making recommendations for action at

all levels of government to prevent them and to control them when they occur. Although the Commission did not complete its final report until March, 1968, it submitted directly to the President a series of interim reports the first of which specifically critiqued the National Guard. Meanwhile, and not to be outdone, the House Armed Services Committee convened on August 10, 1967, a "Special Subcommittee to Inquire into the Capability of the National Guard to Cope with Civil Disturbances."

These two groups were politically competitive in a number of ways. Both were bipartisan, but the Kerner Commission tended toward the Administration's "liberal" interpretation of civil disorder which emphasized social reform. The House subcommittee tended toward a "conservative" interpretation which emphasized the criminal and revolutionary elements of civil disorders. The subcommittee, perceiving itself as an agent of the nation's ultimate authority on military affairs, reflected an institutional jealousy of the President's prerogative as Commander-in-Chief to implement change within the armed forces by order. This was particularly evident in their grilling of the administration's spokesman, Undersecretary of the Army David E. McGiffert. While neither body could afford to confront the powerful lobby of the NGAUS by wholesale condemnation of the Guard, the House subcommittee was much more sensitive than the Commission to that lobby's close connections to grassroots

politics in every state and Congressional district. It therefore rhetorically countered the public criticism of the Guard at Detroit with an unwarranted and vehement assault on Lieutenant General John L. Throckmorton, the federal commander there. Considering the political constraints and tensions acting on these two bodies, it is both surprising and refreshing that despite differences of emphasis their final recommendations were generally useful.⁶³ They were the political mechanisms which translated public concern into institutional reform.

The Kerner Commission had the advantage in implementing its recommendations because it could report directly to the President who could act through the Secretary of Defense. It therefore played the major role in Guard reform. The House subcommittee played the role of political gadfly, representing as it did an alternative position which helped to define issues and, by its very existence, prompted the administration to act quickly.

The heart of the Kerner Commission's recommendations on the National Guard was contained in a letter sent to the President on August 10, 1967. It recommended a substantial increase in the number of blacks in the Army and Air National Guard; immediate emphasis on civil disturbance training for all Guard units; and a review of both the records of all Guard officers and the system of promoting them and granting them federal recognition.⁶⁴

The second of these recommendations had already been implemented by the President on August 6. Nevertheless, he forwarded the complete letter to Secretary of Defense McNamara, calling it "a matter of extreme urgency," and directing McNamara to give it his "immediate attention."⁶⁵ That immediate attention resulted in two Department of the Army boards: the Hollingsworth Board, convened on August 23, 1967, to study the quality and management of reserve component officers, and the Williams Board, convened on August 31, 1967, to study the participation of blacks in the reserve components.⁶⁶ The President's order of August 6, the Hollingsworth Board and the Williams Board, direct consequences of the Detroit and Newark riots, each had its effect upon the OARNG between September, 1967, and its next major challenge on the streets in April, 1968.

Concurrently with these actions, Secretary McNamara exploited the public clamor for Guard reform to initiate a general reorganization of the Army National Guard. McNamara had long felt that the dual system of the Army Reserve, a federal institution, and the Army National Guard, a federally maintained group of state militias available to the President on order, was anachronistic and inefficient. Recognizing that politically he could not do away with the Guard, he advocated integrating the reserve into it and tightening federal control over it. At the root of his

concern was his perception that many Guard units were so undermanned and poorly equipped that they could not be brought to a state of combat readiness quickly enough to be of any use in wartime. Until the fall of 1967, his plans had been stopped by the NGAUS and the House Armed Services Committee.⁶⁷

National Guard opposition to McNamara's plans followed many threads. Guardsmen correctly perceived in his solution to the problem of undermanning the elimination and consolidation of Guard units with a consequent loss of officer and NCO authorizations. No Guardsman wanted to risk losing his job in such a plan. State governors were less than enthusiastic about any reduction in their opportunities for political patronage through their powers of officer appointment. The opposition was more than simple self-interest, however. Guard officers jealously protected their status as state militia against encroachment by the Federal government on principle. They believed in that status as an inherent part of the peoples' right to keep and bear arms. Guard units had long, proud traditions of state and national service and strong bonds with their local communities. Convincing any community that its unit, a veteran of the nation's last three wars and innumerable local emergencies, was not needed would be difficult, to say the least.

Nevertheless, the deed was done, testimony to the

perceived political strength of the public alarm. The National Guard and the House Armed Services Committee made a gallant, symbolic last stand when on August 11, 1967, the day after Chief of Staff of the Army General Ralph E. Haines had described the McNamara proposal to the aforementioned subcommittee, the subcommittee chairman summoned all of the Adjutants General of the states and territories. The subcommittee listened as Major General Arthur Y. Lloyd of Kentucky described how the McNamara proposal would erode the Guard's ability to perform its state mission. Asked if they concurred in Lloyd's assessment, the Adjutants General, including Ohio's Major General Hostetler, unanimously voted yes.⁶⁸ This sort of strenuous opposition insured that McNamara could not implement his plan without compromise.

As finally ordered in November, 1967, the McNamara reorganization reduced the Guard's twenty-three combat divisions to eight and eighteen separate brigades. The reduction included the loss of 1,118 units and 8,949 individual positions. One of the casualties was Ohio's vaunted 37th Infantry Division, which was reorganized as a brigade of a division headquartered in Indiana. Theoretically, none of the surviving units were to be at less than 90% of full strength although it appears that some in fact were. The problems of seriously undermanned units (50% and less) and redundant or obsolete units were largely solved. The reorganization provided for the creation of

125 company-size units beyond those emerging directly from the consolidation. They were mostly military police, transportation, medical and headquarters units. This appeared both as a balm to the Guard and a measure taken to specifically enhance the Guard's civil disturbance capability, but was more likely a happy adjunct to the central purpose of increasing the combat readiness and self-sufficiency of the retained divisions and brigades. The plan authorized the creation and permanent manning in each state of an Emergency Operations Headquarters (EOH) under the Adjutant General which could be used as an instrument of state command and control anytime the state's Guard was mobilized. Secretary McNamara skillfully rode the crest of apparent public opinion on the Guard's riot control capability to implement necessary improvements in the Guard's combat readiness.⁶⁹

The Hollingsworth and Williams Boards performed yeoman service in studying their respective topics but neither had a significant, immediate effect on the National Guard.

The Williams Board proceeded on the assumption that unless the Guard had a representative number of black members it could not be optimally effective at civil disturbance control in black neighborhoods.⁷⁰ It noted that nowhere in the United States was black participation in the National Guard anywhere near proportionate to the black

population of the United States, then at about 11.2%. The Ohio Army National Guard, it found, had 246 black members, or 1.5% of its 15,774 member assigned strength. The reasons for this poor representation included the unattractiveness of the Guard to black youth, especially as compared to the regular services; institutional barriers to blacks such as mental aptitude entrance examinations which favored the better educated, and the location of many Guard units away from the centers of black population; and a reluctance on the part of Guard recruiters to make any special effort to attract blacks into the Guard.⁷¹ A major reason for the latter was that Guard units were manned at full authorized strength throughout the 1960s because many men chose service in the Guard as an alternative to conscription and assignment to Vietnam. Every unit maintained a waiting list of hopeful recruits. One could not simply "join" the National Guard; one had to get on the list and await one's turn for a vacancy. In Ohio, units had to provide the state headquarters with copies of their lists regularly and the lists were subject to scrutiny by the Inspector General, which served as a check to blatant racial discrimination. It is nevertheless fair to say that the lists contained the names of whites almost exclusively and that their existence was both a barrier to blacks and a brake on Guard efforts to recruit anyone aggressively.⁷²

The Williams Board suggested that an effort be made to

gradually increase the black percentage of the Guard over a three-year period with the goal of achieving alignment with the population by 1970. The Department of Defense generally implemented this suggestion between 1968 and 1970. The effect on the OARNG was little more than heightened consciousness, however. Major General Sylvester T. Del Corso, Ohio's Adjutant General from 1968 to 1970, personally supported both equal opportunity within the Guard and a special recruiting program to meet the goals set by the National Guard Bureau.⁷³ An aggressive program to recruit blacks into the OARNG did not begin until 1971 with the appointment of Command Sergeant Major Wilbur Jones as special minority recruiter.⁷⁴ Not coincidentally, this effort occurred simultaneously with declining draft calls, the scaling down of military operations in Vietnam and a consequent drop in Guard enlistments. When the OARNG first began keeping records of its racial make-up in 1974, it showed black participation at 4%.⁷⁵ The civil disturbance experience prompted the Federal government to induce efforts to recruit more blacks into the OARNG. Because the OARNG enjoyed a manpower abundance, a situation due to the war in Vietnam, those efforts were half-hearted and did not result in any significant improvement in Guard opportunities for blacks.

The Hollingsworth Board was a direct response to the President's implementation of the Kerner Commission's recommendation that an overall review of National Guard

officer quality be made. The board visited Ohio on September 27, 1967, as part of its study.⁷⁶ It concluded that overall the officer corps of the reserve components was qualified and that "standards in general were adequate." It made 102 specific recommendations for change in the system of officer management. It believed that those changes would result in time in a necessary and substantial improvement in the quality of reserve officers by eliminating poor performers and by attracting and retaining high-quality officers. The Department of the Army implemented all of the board's recommendations over the next eighteen months.⁷⁷ While there was understandable resentment toward the board on the part of Guard officers, there is no evidence to show that its actions resulted directly in the elimination of any single officer from the OARNG.⁷⁸ Its most immediate effect on the civil disturbance control capability of the Guard was its recommendation that a twelve-hour block of instruction on civil disturbances be added to the curriculum of the Officer Candidate School program provided to the states by the Army. Also to be added were eighteen additional hours of military leadership training.⁷⁹ One must conclude that these initiatives, taken as a direct consequence of Guard performance at Detroit and Newark, were probably beneficial in the long run. There is nothing, however, to indicate that they resulted in improved performance on the part of the OARNG in civil disturbance control operations over the

next three years.

If neither the Hollingsworth nor the Williams Board had a significant and immediate impact on the OARNG beyond occupying the minds of its officers, two other federal initiatives did: the reorganization and the Army's response to Johnson's order of August 6.

The National Guard Bureau issued McNamara's reorganization order in December, 1967, set a completion date of March, 1968, and solicited comments from the Adjutants General. The response from Ohio was to move the completion date up to February 15, 1968, a self-imposed inconvenience chosen specifically because OARNG officers wanted to have the reorganization complete well before the expected round of civil disturbances began in the spring.⁸⁰ The Bureau approved the request.

To complete Ohio's part of the reorganization was no small task. Eighty-one company-size units underwent some sort of reorganization or redesignation. Thirteen were eliminated outright and their personnel transferred to other units, voluntarily separated, or retained temporarily as authorized over-strength. Thirty-seven company-size units became new units with completely different missions and organizations. For example, Company C, 2d Battalion, 145th Infantry in Ashland and Mansfield became the 1486th and 1487th Transportation Companies; Company B, 737th

Maintenance Battalion in Zanesville became Battery B, 2d Battalion, 174th Artillery; Company C, 137th Signal Battalion in Springfield became Company C, 216th Engineer Battalion. New units were created, too. Among them was the 50th Military Police Group with a battalion each in Youngstown and Toledo. The movement of personnel and equipment, the retraining of soldiers, and the reconstitution of unit records implied by such changes greatly disrupted normal Guard activity in the winter of 1967-1968.⁸¹

At state headquarters, the order authorized creation of an Emergency Operation Headquarters (EOH). This allowed augmentation of the state headquarters detachment, a small and purely administrative institution, with sufficient staff personnel to coordinate and support large-scale Guard operations. This was necessary because after the deactivation of the 37th Infantry Division with its headquarters and staff, the OARNG consisted of seven roughly equal subordinate commands and four independent battalions, none of which possessed the staff capability to control the whole in a state emergency.⁸²

The EOH was an operational headquarters, not a planning headquarters. Responsibility for civil disturbance planning in Ohio rested on the task force area commanders and, informally, on the Military Support to Civil Defense Section of the state headquarters detachment. This section was established in 1965 to coordinate plans for

defense against nuclear attack. The Adjutant General formally gave the section the civil disturbance and disaster relief planning mission in February, 1968, as part of the overall reorganization, and redesignated it the Military Support to Civil Authorities Section.⁸³

Concurrent with these institutional changes in the Guard were doctrinal changes initiated by the Department of the Army. The Detroit and Newark riots clearly demonstrated that a doctrinal gap existed between the Army's approach to riot control, focused on the classical "surging mob" model, and its approach to combat in cities in a war zone.⁸⁴ The ghetto riots were something in between. The Johnson administration, as well as senior officials of the Army, recognized the necessity of substantial revision of Army doctrine for civil disturbance control.⁸⁵

Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor anticipated the doctrinal changes in the immediate aftermath of Detroit when he sent a directive to the Continental Army Command which listed points for future emphasis. The list included a prohibition of major caliber and automatic weapons, better direct control of armed soldiers by their officers and the use of designated teams of selected marksmen to counter snipers.⁸⁶ On August 6, 1967, Johnson ordered the Army to initiate an intensive civil disturbance training course for all Guard units to be completed before the end of September, and to develop appropriate doctrine and

training for all active, reserve and Guard units on civil disturbance control.⁸⁷

The training conducted by the Guard in August and September, 1967, tested the Army's first effort at doctrinal revision. Army planners combined the results of that experience with a canvass of all Adjutants General to produce Training Circular 19-3 on January 5, 1968, and Army Subject Schedule 19-6 on February 21. On March 25, the Army published a revised edition of its Field Manual 19-15, Civil Disturbances and Disasters. These three documents were the heart of the new doctrine.⁸⁸

The new army doctrine addressed two central problems of civil disturbance control: first, that the nature of civil disturbances had changed and therefore soldiers needed to be prepared for a variety of tactical situations on the streets; and second, that civil disturbances were not warfare of any kind and therefore strict control of the force inherent in military formations was necessary. The former was the easier problem to solve. While the old "riot control formations," the advancing lines of bayonets, remained in the new manuals, they lost pride of place to new chapters on anti-sniper techniques, apprehension of looters, and protection of fire-fighting units. Doctrine called for isolation of the disturbance area by a cordon of road-blocks and patrols. Small unit patrolling and the duties of junior leaders became matters of emphasis.⁸⁹

The more difficult problem was controlling the committed forces so that order could be restored with minimum application of force. Soldiers are easiest to control and make the greatest psychological impression when employed in mass and yet the very nature of the disturbances required dispersal. The logical solution of this dilemma was to employ large numbers of troops early, before a disturbance became widespread or violent. Commitment of troops, of course, was a civilian responsibility. After the Detroit and Newark riots, civilian officials showed a much greater willingness to call in troops early in a disturbance.⁹⁰ Army doctrine reflected this concern for early and prompt troop commitment in several ways. It called for extensive prior planning of civil disturbance contingencies with local civilian officials and detailed preparation of alert, assembly, and deployment procedures. It emphasized "show of force" tactics designed to deter violence by intimidation rather than force. Most significantly, the Army allowed National Guard units to hold unannounced, unscheduled training assemblies at Federal expense. This meant that Guard units could be alerted and assembled in their armories at the first signs of trouble. If not needed, they could conduct training for up to forty-eight hours, count the assembly time against their normal training schedule, and pass the costs to the Federal government. If needed, they were immediately available.⁹¹ Army doctrine reflected the

assumption that early deployment obviated the need for more overt use of force.

Tactical doctrine emphasized the use of minimum essential force, incrementally and selectively against specifically identified threats to law and order. All soldiers were to receive instruction on the legal constraints on their use of weapons.⁹² Major caliber weapons were prohibited. Automatic weapons were either to be left behind or modified prior to commitment so that only single shots could be fired. Strict criteria were provided for the decision to shoot: only upon direct order of an officer or NCO, or in defense of one's life or to prevent clearly imminent death or injury to another; only when lesser means are unavailable or have been exhausted; and only when the threat of injury to others is minimal. Shots were to be single and deliberately aimed to wound, not kill. Sniper fire was to be countered whenever possible only by specially trained teams of marksmen and not by a general return of fire by soldiers in the area. Officer and NCO control of soldiers was paramount.

What is striking about these doctrinal changes is that none of them would have come as any surprise in Ohio. Indeed, a major source of the Army's new doctrine was the canvass of Adjutants General conducted in August. Ohio's response to that inquiry touched on virtually every point later emphasized in the Army's new doctrinal guidance:

prior planning, police liaison, protection of fire fighters, techniques of patrolling and so on. The only major difference was that the OARNG now believed as a matter of policy that Guardsmen should carry loaded weapons into civil disturbances whereas the Army recommended that the issuance of ammunition and the loading of weapons each be separate and deliberate increments in the application of force.⁹³ The new doctrine institutionalized for the entire Army National Guard as well as the active Army many of those techniques which Guardsmen in Ohio had been learning on the streets for the past two years.

Not surprisingly, new training and planning programs accompanied the new doctrine. Army Subject Schedule 19-6, which appeared in February, 1968, and called for thirty-three hours of instruction in civil disturbance control for all soldiers and an additional eighteen hours for commanders and staffs, became the annual requirement for civil disturbance control training. The Army established the Civil Disturbance Orientation Course at Ft. Gordon, Georgia, and in the late winter of 1967-68 required attendance by senior Guard officers from each state. These officers returned to their states to conduct a one-time, mandatory thirty-two hour leadership workshop designed to prepare junior officers for their duties in civil disturbance control operations. Ft. Gordon thereafter conducted regular training sessions throughout the year

for officers of all components and civilians on a voluntary basis.⁹⁴

To oversee planning and policy formulation, the Army established the Directorate for Civil Disturbance Planning and Operations within the Department of the Army. This directorate was a clearing-house for civil disturbance information and worked through the Continental Army Command to coordinate plans for the commitment of Federal troops to certain "targeted" American cities. Not unreasonably, Federal officers were concerned that plans for the employment of Federal troops mesh with extant plans for the employment of National Guard troops under state authority. To this end, the 1st Continental Army headquarters requested copies of all of Ohio's contingency plans as early as October, 1967, and from that point on, OARNG officers met regularly with their active duty counterparts to exchange information and update plans. Such plans were detailed to the extent of earmarking active Army formations for specific Ohio cities: the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Ft. Carson, Colorado, had the mission of responding upon the President's order to disturbances in Cleveland and Toledo; Cincinnati was covered by the 101st Airborne Division at Ft. Campbell, Kentucky.⁹⁵ From a military standpoint, these measures were prudent and correct. They were designed to preclude repetition of the Detroit tragedy. They also represented in effect an

uncomfortable degree of federal and military supervision of state and local law enforcement activity.

Not all of the initiatives taken in the wake of Detroit came from the Federal government. In September, 1967, the Ohio legislature passed House Bill 734, which added three important sections to the Ohio Revised Code. Section 5923.231 defined the governor's powers to declare martial law and limited the Guard's power of arrest under martial law to the purpose of escorting suspects to the appropriate civil agency. Section 5923.36 imposed a limitation of two years on any civil action brought against a Guardsman for alleged misconduct while on duty during a civil disturbance. Section 5923.37 protected Guardsmen from civil suit over their actions in a disturbance except in the case of willful or wanton misconduct. Senate Bill 232, also passed in September, raised a Guardsman's pay while on state active duty from \$6.00 per day to \$12.80 per day.⁹⁶ The OARNG had long desired the latter three new laws. Their passage in September, 1967, at the height of the national criticism of the Guard, was an important vote of confidence by the legislature for the Ohio Army National Guard.

Many other initiatives to improve Guard readiness for civil disturbances followed in company with these major doctrinal, institutional, and legal changes.⁹⁷ They all reflect the public alarm and federal response which Detroit

and Newark precipitated. After 1967, OARNG planning for civil disturbances stepped in time with a multitude of federal agencies and programs.⁹⁸ If the pace and format of Guard preparation in Ohio were now different, however, the principle was not. The new doctrine reflected generally what Guardsmen in Ohio had been thinking for two years. The training programs and planning sessions with regular officers were extensions of activities in which OARNG officers had been participating since 1964. If the Army National Guard as a whole had been subject to ridicule in the press, it was not because Ohio Guardsmen had bungled. Their civil disturbance operations to date had been performed well.⁹⁹ Given this, one might expect a certain hostility on the part of OARNG officers as federal officials searched their records for misfits, probed for signs of racial prejudice and discrimination, and blithely dissolved or reorganized veteran units, all while journalists churned out a littany of written ridicule. If such hostility existed, it apparently did not interfere with OARNG cooperation with all federal initiatives. Nor did it manifest itself in any lack of initiative on the part of the OARNG itself. Guard officers cooperated fully and contributed to the efforts at improving their institutional ability to handle civil disturbances.¹⁰⁰ Given the tremendous turbulence of the doctrinal and institutional transition between August, 1967, and the spring of 1968, one might reasonably expect a

diminution of the OARNG's proficiency at civil disturbance control after that period. Such an expectation can be tested by examining events in Ohio beginning in April, 1968.

CHAPTER IV

On April 4, 1968, an assassin shot and killed Dr. Martin Luther King as he stood on the balcony of his motel room in Memphis, Tennessee. Few possible events could have been more tragic for race relations in America. Dr. King had symbolized the hopes of millions of black Americans for the achievement of racial equality through non-violent means in their lifetimes. In 1968, some younger, very radical black leaders saw no hope of compromise with white society and no hope of change short of revolution. They presented a serious challenge to the leadership of Dr. King and other moderates of the civil rights movement. His murder seemed to refute everything good he had ever said about American society and thus was a powerful argument in favor of more radical action.

Perhaps surprisingly, the reaction to his death was not immediately violent. It wasn't until the memorial services several days after the shooting that large throngs of mourners gathered in the streets of America's cities. Then it took very little to provoke violence. A harsh word from a policeman, a thrown rock, a hasty arrest and the collective anguish of multitudes of grieving and frustrated

black citizens vented itself again on the symbols of their plight. In 125 cities across the United States, 50,000 National Guardsmen were ordered into the streets. In Chicago, Baltimore and Washington, D.C., regular troops joined the fray. Within a week, the number of reported disorders and of troops deployed exceeded the totals for all of 1967.¹⁰¹

In Ohio, disturbances broke out in Youngstown and Cincinnati just as mass demonstrations in memory of Dr. King were ending on April 8. Again, the pattern was that of Watts. Roving bands of black youths broke store windows and looted, pelted police with rocks and other debris, and started fires. Now there was none of the hesitancy in summoning Guard assistance as there had been at Cleveland less than two years before. Both cities requested and the governor authorized Guard troops on April 8 and within twelve hours over 1,000 Guardsmen were in each city. In Cincinnati, elements of the 1st Battalion, 147th Infantry, the 512th Engineer Battalion and the 1st Squadron, 238th Armored Cavalry made a brief appearance with police which halted the outburst by the morning of April 9. Some units remained on stand-by until April 15 but were not committed again in any significant action. In Youngstown, 1,314 troops of the 2d Squadron, 107th Armored Cavalry and the newly created 437th Military Police Battalion patrolled the disturbed area near Hillman Street until

April 13.¹⁰²

The Youngstown operation illustrates several important points about the state of OARNG civil disturbance control in early 1968. First, the tactics were those which by now were strictly doctrinaire: a cordon of the afflicted area, street clearance, and stability operations in the form of joint Guard/police patrols, maintenance of checkpoints and sentries guarding vital municipal facilities. Second, these operations were conducted in accordance with detailed plans prepared in advance through the Guard LNO. Third, Guardsmen adhered to Ohio's now standard policy on deadly force, which was more permissive than Army doctrine; Guardsmen carried loaded rifles into Youngstown and operated four jeeps mounted with .30-caliber machine guns. They fired no rounds. Fourth, the Guard enjoyed the full cooperation of civil authority. As an example, Mayor Anthony Flask imposed a 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. curfew immediately upon the outbreak of disturbances and banned the sale of gasoline and alcoholic beverages in and near the riot area. Fifth, the Guard commander, Colonel Merton Day, exploited the psychological effect of the arrival of troops by daily news conferences. These not only touted the progress of the Guard in gaining control of the city, but broadcast the presence, made possible by the new federal guidelines, of several hundred extra troops on "stand-by" in local armories.¹⁰³

Each of these points is significant. They show that despite the turbulence of the winter of 1967-68, the OARNG had continued successfully its development of the task force and LNO systems. The tactics learned from Watts, at Cleveland and Dayton, and in the intensive training following Detroit, had been rehearsed sufficiently to be applied again, months later, in Youngstown. Those tactics were appropriate to this type of disturbance. Newly formed units such as the 437th MP Battalion could perform reasonably well. Discipline and leadership in these two battalions was of sufficient quality to prevent unnecessary gunfire despite the large number of armed soldiers. At least in this case Guard and civilian officials could work together smoothly toward a common goal. National Guard officers were aware of the authority inherent in military formations and were willing to apply this psychological leverage vigorously to civil disturbances as a substitute for raw force. In sum, the Youngstown operation shows that the OARNG had a doctrine of civil disturbance control which was a real operational capability because of adequate training and detailed planning. Second, it shows that that doctrine, applied to a specific tactical situation, successfully stopped and deterred violence with minimum application of force. Judging by the Youngstown experience, one can say that by April, 1968, the OARNG, as much despite federal assistance as because of it, was indeed proficient

at civil disturbance control.

On April 5, 1968, Ohio's Adjutant General, Major General Hostetler, retired. The man promoted to his place was Sylvester T. Del Corso, a native Ohioan who had gone to World War II and the Korean War with the OARNG. Staying on active duty after the Korean War, he took his last active assignment as the United States Property and Fiscal Officer to the OARNG. From this position, he transferred to the OARNG and received advancement to the Adjutant General.¹⁰⁴

Del Corso's leadership of the OARNG between 1968 and 1970 is important because it helps explain the OARNG's approach to civil disturbance control in those years. Like other Guard officers, Del Corso was sensitive about the Guard's status as the combat reserve of the active Army. It was, in his opinion, the Guard's primary mission and one he did not wish to see subordinated to civil disturbance control or, worse, given over wholly to the Army Reserve. Such an event could well be the first step toward loss of federal funding and the eventual elimination of the Guard altogether. Thus, Del Corso's first priority task was to attain and maintain proficiency at the Guard's wartime mission. He sincerely believed that "98%" of the training Guardsmen needed for civil disturbance control was contained in their normal training cycle for combat. In his opinion, the discipline, leadership, organization and individual

and small unit skills practiced in combat training were directly translatable to the civil disturbance mission.¹⁰⁵ This does not mean that he thought no special civil disturbance training was necessary. On the contrary, he was very concerned that units which had experienced one or more disturbances might become complacent about doing the necessary training.¹⁰⁶ He simply did not want the civil disturbance mission to obscure the OARNG's combat mission.

Del Corso's leadership style was soldierly yet not autocratic. He consciously sought the opinions of staff officers and subordinates and liked to appoint committees to investigate and recommend solutions for specific problems. He delegated authority. He expected first-rate performance from his subordinates and was not afraid to "roll heads." By the same token, he did not consider it necessary to watch their every move over their shoulders. He did not visit Cincinnati or Youngstown during the April disorders, whereas Hostetler frequently remained at the scene of disturbances. He was tactful and cooperative, but firm, in relations with civil authorities. In disturbances, he wanted Guard units to be able to perform a certain number of operations well. He wanted civil authorities to assign missions in writing consistent with those capabilities and the advice of the commander. Finally, he wanted free reign to accomplish the mission.¹⁰⁷ This business-like approach to his job generally and to civil

disturbance control specifically characterized his tenure as Adjutant General.

If the OARNG had a "long, hot summer" during the 1960s, it was the summer of 1968. Hundreds of troops were called out for weeks at a time to augment the guard force in the state penitentiaries in June, July, August and September.¹⁰⁸ Racial disturbances requiring Guard action rocked Akron and Cleveland in July. At one point, the entire OARNG and part of the Air Guard were mobilized in anticipation of riots which happily did not occur. Of these experiences, Cleveland most poignantly illustrates the capacity of the OARNG and the style of its new Adjutant General.

Cleveland escaped trouble in the aftermath of Dr. King's assassination largely due to the leadership of Mayor Carl B. Stokes, the first black to hold that office. Elected by a coalition of blacks and liberal whites, Stokes' administration rested on a foundation of hope that it marked the advent of improved race relations for the city. Control of civil disturbances was thus a more politically volatile issue for Stokes than it might have been had he been white.

In late July, 1968, the Cleveland Police Department received a warning from an informant that on July 24, black revolutionaries would start violence in Cleveland and several other major cities in Ohio and across the country

in an attempt to initiate a national insurgency by blacks. The key role in Cleveland was allegedly to be played by the Black Nationalists of New Libya, a radical splinter group of no apparent influence led by a self-styled mystic named Fred "Ahmed" Evans. In response to this report, the police assigned a surveillance team to watch Evans' movements beginning July 23.¹⁰⁹

What sparked the incident is not exactly clear, but in the early evening of July 23, gunfire erupted between the police and the New Libyans at their headquarters in the black community of Glenville. A pitched battle ensued with Evans and his followers using military carbines and rifles to fend off police assaults. Seven persons, including three policemen, were killed. In operations in support of the assault on the New Libyans, police used tear gas, made arrests and fired their weapons liberally, embroiling many persons who had nothing to do with Evans and his group. Rioting quickly spread throughout the Glenville and Hough areas in the manner of 1966. It soon became evident that the disturbance was beyond the capacity of the Cleveland Police Department to contain. The intelligence report predicting Evans' initiation of larger disturbances became a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Mayor Stokes reported the situation to Governor Rhodes at 9:15 p.m. on July 23. The Governor in turn ordered General Del Corso from Akron, where he was observing the

final stages of Guard civil disturbance control operations which had been going on there since July 18, to Cleveland. After conferring with Del Corso, Stokes agreed to Guard commitment and published the necessary proclamations. By 1:00 a.m., some 2,300 Guardsmen of the 107th Armored Cavalry Regiment and other nearby units had assembled in their armories. By 3:00 a.m., they were conducting joint patrols of the riot-torn district with the Cleveland police. Meanwhile, ostensibly fearing that events in Akron and Cleveland heralded the predicted national uprising, Rhodes assembled the entire Ohio Army National Guard and approximately one-fourth of the Air National Guard in their armories as a precautionary measure.¹¹⁰

On July 24, Mayor Stokes faced the dilemma of preventing further violence without invoking measures which would seem inappropriate to his mandate. The city was temporarily quiet, but violence promised to resume in the evening. To complicate matters, the Guard and police, those very institutions which from Stokes' perspective symbolized the failed policies of his predecessors, believed that they had control of the afflicted neighborhoods and could cope with further disorders if left in place.¹¹¹

Stokes met with some 100 black community leaders in the morning and with city and Guard officials in the afternoon. In the latter meeting, he and Del Corso debated a variety of optional uses of the Guard. Del Corso was

adamantly opposed to any tactics other than those which had proved successful in every racial disturbance in Ohio to date. Stokes was unconvinced that massive commitment of troops was the only answer. He advocated a cordon of the Hough and Glenville districts and the employment within the cordon of black troops only, without weapons, as part of a volunteer task force to persuade the residents not to riot. The idea was anathema to Del Corso: his troops would be employed only as units under their own officers and no Guardsman would enter the riot area unarmed.¹¹²

Mayor Stokes was the superior civil authority in this case and at least theoretically could require the Guard to perform any reasonable mission. Under law, the means of accomplishment were the responsibility of the commander. Therefore, if Stokes wanted the Guard to clear the streets and patrol the riot zone he could give it that mission, but he could not dictate how the troops so employed would be organized or equipped. If he was dissatisfied with the troop commander's efforts and could reach no compromise, he could withdraw the mission or ask for the commander's relief. On these points the debate hinged. It is to the credit of both Stokes and Del Corso, each approaching the problem of civil disturbance control from fundamentally different perspectives, that they reached a compromise: the Guard was to withdraw from the riot zone and establish a tight cordon around it. The mayor provided for the patrol

of the cordoned areas by black police officers and a committee of unarmed black volunteers. It is further to the credit of both men that during the period of the disturbances they publicly presented a united opinion.¹¹³

There is controversy over whether Stokes' decision was a wise one or not. The Guard cordon operated very effectively on July 24, but looting and arson continued inside it.¹¹⁴ Advocates of the mayor's decision would point to the facts that the scale of disorder was much smaller and that July 24 was the last night of any significant disorder. They would argue that the black citizen patrols were effective in persuading neighborhood residents to go home and in signalling the Stokes' administration's commitment to new solutions to old problems which hopefully would preclude the need for force or violence by anyone. Opponents of his decision argue that the violence which did occur on July 24 could have been prevented by the Guardsmen already in place. They would point to the fact that the mayor directed the Guard to reoccupy the cordoned area on July 25 as evidence that his citizen patrol had failed. They would critique the mayor's decision to withdraw the Guard as condoning in effect the lawlessness of those persons who had rioted thus far and as encouraging them to do violence again. There is, of course, no answer to this controversy since the disturbances cannot be repeated. It is important because it underscores the philosophical differences between

approaches to civil disturbance control which different persons or institutions can take. Certainly Mayor Stokes' approach was different from Mayor Hall's in Dayton in 1966 or Mayor Flask's in Youngstown in April, 1968. Yet in each of these cases the OARNG effectively performed appropriate missions in support of the approach taken by the respective civil authority. Its performance at Cleveland clearly demonstrates that it was a useful instrument of civil disturbance control even when unable for political reasons to apply its preferred doctrinal techniques. That performance further demonstrates that even in cases where there was strong disagreement between military and civilian officials, the civil authority remained supreme. OARNG officers capably supported the lawful orders of the civil government despite their preference for more strictly doctrinaire employment of their troops.

Between July, 1968, when Guard troops pulled out of Cleveland, and April, 1970, when they occupied Ohio campuses, the OARNG enjoyed a relative respite from civil disturbance control duties. More prison disturbances required the deployment of 450 Guardsmen to Columbus and Mansfield in April, 1969. A company of the 437th MP Battalion participated in control of a racial disturbance in Youngstown in July of that year. The largest call-out of troops during the period also occurred in July when

1,000 Guardsmen responded to racial disorders on the east side of Columbus.¹¹⁵ This trend was a sharp reversal of the tendency since 1965 of civil disturbances to increase in frequency and magnitude. It proved just sufficient to keep civil disturbance planning and training in the forefront of Guard activities in the latter two years of the decade.

In the immediate aftermath of Cleveland, it was anything but apparent that the next twenty-one months would be relatively calm. Initiatives prompted by Ohio's three years of civil disturbance experience received fresh impetus from the Cleveland action. The OARNG published and distributed a pamphlet entitled "Guidelines for Small Unit Commanders and Troops," which gave specific instructions to each soldier on his personal responsibilities during a civil disturbance. The Guard produced a standard press pass to be issued to legitimate news reporters desiring access to cordoned areas or other Guard facilities.¹¹⁶ In July, August and October, 1968, the OARNG, assisted by the Ohio Peace Officers' Training Council and the Ohio Crime Commission, sponsored several three-day clinics for police and fire department officials and other interested agencies on civil-military cooperation during civil disturbances.¹¹⁷ The most important development of the period was the publication of Operations Plan Number 2 (OPLAN 2), the first comprehensive doctrinal statement on civil disturbance control issued by the OARNG.¹¹⁸

OPLAN 2, largely the work of the Military Support to

Civil Authorities Section of the state headquarters, appeared in final form in May, 1969. The doctrine it espoused combined the essential elements of U.S. Army doctrine with OARNG experience to date and gave specific information on how the OARNG was organized for the civil disturbance mission.¹¹⁹ It outlined Ohio's four task force areas and demonstrated that the boundaries had been carefully drawn so that each area included a major unit headquarters, a roughly equal portion of the state population, and a mix of combat and support units. It recommended appropriate missions for Guard units in a civil disturbance and discussed the tactics to be used in accomplishing those missions. These included security of key installations, fire-fighter protection, cordon operations, foot and motorized patrols, and the maintenance and employment of a reserve force. It identified the respective duties and responsibilities of the Adjutant General, the EOH, and the task force area commanders. The task force area commanders were responsible for contingency planning but were only to take operational control of troops in a disturbance when elements of two or more major units were committed. Otherwise, civil disturbance control operations would be directed by the Adjutant General and his staff. In any case, the Adjutant General would assume direction of forces committed to Cleveland, Columbus, Akron, Cincinnati and Dayton. The OPLAN gave detailed guidance for planning civil

disturbance operations, especially in the complex area of administration and logistics. Such details as adequate billeting space with sufficient sanitation facilities (the plan recommended schools), secure sites for motor pools and pre-arranged sources of bulk food were as important to the effective deployment of troops as were tactical operations. Administrative guidance stressed keeping accurate records at all levels of command, and especially unit logs and journals, because of their importance as legal evidence. Where possible, orders were to be transmitted in writing. This section of the plan also covered such details as carrying sufficient workmen's compensation forms in each unit so that injured Guardsmen could be admitted readily to local hospitals: the issue had been a problem at Cleveland. The OPLAN stated the general mission of OARNG troops in civil disturbances: "...to assist civil authorities in the maintenance of law and order and the protection of life and property."¹²⁰

OPLAN 2 spelled out OARNG policy on the use of deadly force. It contained instructions which were to be read verbatim to every soldier deployed to a civil disturbance by his immediate commanding officer. These instructions included an admonition to "use only the minimum force necessary." They specified the incremental increase of force to be applied when dispersing crowds: issue an order to disperse, and insure that it is heard and that an avenue

of dispersal exists; allow sufficient time to disperse after the order; demonstrate the intent to use force by "show of force" formations and warnings; apply "simple physical force," an undefined concept which apparently meant moving against the crowd in formation; rifle butts and bayonets, listed in that order but with no accompanying instructions on exactly what was to be done with them; chemicals; and weapons. Instructions on the use of weapons first stated, "Rifles will be carried with a round in the chamber in the safe position. Exercise care and be safety-minded at all times." Next, "indiscriminate firing of weapons is forbidden. Only single aimed shots at confirmed targets will be employed." The instructions discussed possible targets such as snipers, arsonists, looters or persons who might otherwise pose an immediate threat to life and property. Only in the case of looting was the soldier required to await an order from a superior officer before deciding to shoot. The instructions allowed units to deploy machine guns "for psychological effect," but not with a round in the chamber. The instructions gave this final directive: "...when rioters to whom the Riot Act has been read cannot be dispersed by any other reasonable means, then shooting is justified."¹²¹

OPLAN 2 is an important document for several reasons. First, the very fact of its existence demonstrates that the OARNG by 1969 took its state mission quite seriously.

Second, the detail of the plan argues persuasively that it was not some last-minute effort by a harried lieutenant to fulfill a requirement for an impending inspection. It reflects experienced and deliberate judgment applied to the problem of civil disturbance control. Third, the plan focuses on cities and takes as its model of a civil disturbance the Watts-style ghetto disturbances which had racked the nation since 1965. While most of its provisions were equally applicable to other types of disturbances, it is obvious that the ghetto riots were what OARNG officers perceived, reasonably, as the likely threat. Like Army doctrine, it placed almost no emphasis on mob dispersal with massed formations. Fourth, it specified exactly the degree to which the OARNG differed from Army policy on the use of deadly force. Loaded weapons were required; almost no emphasis was placed on firing only when so ordered; machine guns were acceptable; fire-power could, under certain circumstances, be used to disperse crowds. Finally, the mission statement clearly identifies the OARNG's perception of its role and relationship to civil authority during a disturbance. It was an aid to civil authority and not a substitute for it. It could help maintain law and order and protect life and property; it could stop and deter violence. Beyond that, it had no contribution to make to solving the problems which caused the disturbance in the first place. That, clearly, was a civil responsibility.

CHAPTER V

Ironically, OPLAN 2, with its strong emphasis on ghetto disturbances, appeared in May of 1969, a year of distinct transition in the nature of Ohio civil disturbances. Through 1969, the vast majority of civil disturbances to which the OARNG responded were indeed "Watts-model" ghetto disturbances. After 1969, the Guard responded almost exclusively to disturbances on Ohio campuses. The trend entailed much more than a mere change of location.

The ghetto riots by and large had been spontaneous. They were manifestations of the intense resentment and frustration felt by ghetto residents at their plight. It is likely that the large number of such disturbances in the late 1960s reflected the mobilization of mass feeling by the example of the civil rights demonstrations of the middle of the decade. The riots were triggered by some symbolic act of oppression, frequently an arrest or shooting by police. Generally, they were unplanned, disorganized and without leadership. Ghetto residents vented their collective rage mostly on the property of whites, especially white businesses. When the emotion passed, usually a matter of a few days, the disturbance, having no specific political

goal or organized infrastructure of leadership, passed also. This is not to imply that they were not very dangerous phenomenon. They were. But their danger lay in the oft-realized potential for violence inherent in an enraged mob and in confrontation with authority; the potential for accidental death or injury, especially during the fires; and criminal and extremist exploitation of the breakdown of societal control. In the latter category one can cite the shotgun slayings during the Hough riots in 1966, the armed resistance of Fred Evans and his New Libyans in 1968 and the sniping death of a bystander during the east side riots in Columbus in 1969. It is important to recognize these events as the isolated and usually apolitical acts which they were. Despite exploitation by criminals, despite radical rhetoric, despite the much publicized but largely coincidental similarities to "guerrilla warfare," the ghetto disturbances did not represent revolution or insurrection.¹²²

Ghetto disturbances were inherently self-destructive. Although useful for putting weight behind the rhetoric of some black power leadership, they by no means represented the aim of that leadership, which was the achievement of substantive political power through the mobilization of black consciousness and a black voting block. Such an aim was beginning to be realized in the late 1960s, as the election of Mayor Stokes testifies. Political success held

out the hope of substantial societal change. Hope argued powerfully against self-destruction. The rioting ended.

The advent of disturbances on the campuses, while not wholly unconnected to the ghetto disturbances, must be seen as a separate phenomenon. The one emerged while the other died out. A direct result of the civil rights movement was the admission in the late 1960s of more black students to the nation's colleges and universities. Some of these brought with them considerable experience in political action and a profound sense that society had not moved far or fast enough in the direction of racial equality. They found on the campuses a sympathetic audience of white youth disenchanted with society since the Kennedy assassination in 1963 and politically sensitized by the civil rights movement, conscription and the Vietnam War. The two represented a pool of potential political activism powerful in its own right and subject to exploitation by an array of radical groups which did not exclude revolutionaries and terrorists. Anticipated by the Free Speech Movement at Berkley in 1964, students throughout the country participated increasingly in political campaigns, demonstrations and "student strikes."¹²³ These represented a variety of political goals ranging from immediate grievances against university administrators all the way to alteration of national policy and major social change. Usually peaceful in intent, they carried the potential for violence in the large numbers

of young people they attracted and in the confrontation they frequently sought with authority. Students were quick to experiment with new techniques of applying political pressure: demonstrations became sit-ins, sit-ins inspired vandalism, vandalism brought police, and police-student confrontation often yielded excessive behavior by both parties. The line between legitimate political activism and riot was very thin.

The movement of disturbances from the cities to the campuses had been observable in Ohio, although it is undoubtedly clearer in retrospect than it was at the time. As early as November, 1967, Guardsmen had been summoned to reinforce police and sheriff's deputies at a disturbance at Central State College, a nearly all-black institution near Xenia. Demonstrations had been discreetly monitored by Guard officers at Ohio University, Ohio State University, Kent State University and Oberlin College six times in 1968.¹²⁴ In April and May, 1968, the Governor placed Guard units on alert as a precautionary measure during student demonstrations at Ohio University in Athens and Ohio State University in Columbus. Similarly, demonstrations at the University of Akron in December, 1969, prompted the precautionary assembly of 700 Guardsmen. In none of these last three incidents were troops actually committed. Including the incident at Central State in 1967, the incidents together involved 2,200 troops of whom only 900 were

committed and were slight in comparison with the eleven ghetto disturbances over the same period. These had required the actual commitment of 11,000 troops, not counting the call-up of the entire OARNG in 1968. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that Guard officers gave little thought to the differences between civil disturbances on campuses and those in ghettos.¹²⁵ Neither the Guard nor the universities initiated the sort of contingency planning and liaison which had been going on with the cities since 1965.

But the differences were important. Most important was the fact that campus disturbances were sustained by some type of political leadership which had a degree of control over the actions of many students. That leadership sought to achieve by those actions certain specific goals and was willing to prolong an atmosphere of disorder in an effort to pressure civil authority into negotiation. In such an environment, the mere appearance of the Guard did not necessarily have the same deterrent effect that it had in the ghettos where the goals of the rioters were ephemeral and opportunistic. Further, many of the activities undertaken by that leadership were lawful and only potentially violent or unlawful. In a ghetto disturbance, the many residents who had no desire to participate stayed in their houses, while the rioters and looters took to the streets in a clearly unlawful manner. It was thus a relatively simple matter for the Guard to clear a street or prevent

movement past a road-block. On a campus, sorting out the vandals, the instigators, and the violence-prone from the peaceful protestors and the students who were uninvolved was more difficult. There was no such thing as "clearing" an area except in the case of actual and evident riot.

Another important difference between campuses and ghettos was topography. The ghettos were inner-city communities composed of buildings of similar size arranged on regular city blocks. The matrix of streets and alleyways and the absence of yards and other large, open areas facilitated cordon operations, street clearance, crowd control and stability patrolling. Campuses offered large, open areas between ponderous buildings, often interspersed with parks, trees and shrubbery. The many walkways, streets and avenues of exit and entrance to surrounding communities were irregular. Thus, sealing off a campus or moving a group of people forcefully from one point to another across it was much more difficult than when in an inner city neighborhood.

Finally, the participants themselves were different. In the ghettos, Guardsmen confronted small groups of rioters and looters, usually not more than a dozen or so persons per group, although there might be hundreds of such groups roaming a riot area. These persons, through long and bitter experience with police, understood force and had no great desire to challenge the National Guard. They would

rather avoid than confront troops. The campus demonstrators, on the other hand, often attracted thousands of people, all massed in one place. Such a crowd is potentially more dangerous. Further, these crowds were of people who had little experience with police, let alone troops, and many of whom perceived themselves as doing something noble if not always legal or lawful. In some cases, they sought confrontation. They were therefore less likely to respond to orders from police or Guard officials.¹²⁶

No better example of these characteristics of campus disorders can be found in Ohio's experience than the incident at Ohio State University in Columbus between April 29 and May 7, 1970. Combined with a second deployment between May 21 and 27, events there brought the longest and largest deployment of OARNG troops to a university campus in Ohio's history.

The generalizations made earlier about college youth in the late 1960s can be applied to students at OSU in the spring of 1970. Added to the concerns about racism and the war were several purely local frustrations arising out of increased enrollments and costs and the general perception among students that the administration was indifferent to their desire to influence university policy.¹²⁷ Within this milieu of dissatisfaction, several groups operated in pursuit of specific goals: Afro-Am, a black group,

wanted larger black enrollments and a Department of Afro-American Studies; the Third World Solidarity Committee and the Columbus Moratorium Committee militated against American involvement in Vietnam; a scattering of women's rights activists with no apparent organization voiced their desires for more women on the staff and faculty and greater sensitivity to women's issues generally. In late April, 1970, representatives of these and other groups and currents formed the Ad Hoc Committee for Student Rights, a "front" designed to direct student efforts to put pressure on the university administration. Among this committee's demands were the creation of a Department of Afro-American Studies and several related demands, amnesty for students arrested in disorders earlier in the year, and abolition of defense research, military recruiting and ROTC on campus. When the administration rejected these demands because they failed to acknowledge university initiatives and seemed designed only as a pretext for future disruptive action, the Ad Hoc Committee called for a student boycott of classes to begin on April 29. The student assembly voted to support the boycott on April 28.

A rally in support of the boycott at noon on April 29 drew some 2,000 students to the Oval, a parklike common of some 10 acres in the center of the campus. From there, large groups of students moved to block the main entrances of the university while others marched on the Administration

Building to voice their dissent. Some among this latter group threw rocks at the building, smashing several windows. Officers of the Ohio State Highway Patrol, requested earlier by university officials in anticipation of trouble, moved quickly to protect the building. They fired tear gas cannisters into the crowd to disperse it. Simultaneously, police attempted to disperse demonstrators from the university gates where they were blocking public thoroughfares. These latter were met by a hail of rocks, bottles, jeers and taunts. When they responded with tear-gas, the fight was on. Students ran rampant through the off-campus "fraternity row" area along 15th Avenue and the adjacent business section of High Street. They inflicted some minor damage to business establishments, but mostly they battled police with stones and bricks. Liberal police application of tear-gas soon mobilized hundreds of otherwise uninvolved students from the fraternity houses. By 4:00 p.m., seven persons had been felled by police shotguns and the commander of the Highway Patrol units, in conjunction with the Columbus Police Department and the university president, placed a request to the Governor's office for Guard assistance. Governor Rhodes authorized use of the Guard at 5:30 p.m., and within six hours a company of infantry occupied the intersection of 15th Avenue and High Street.

Guard operations over the next several days generally reflected OARNG civil disturbance control doctrine as it

had evolved in the ghettos since 1965. The 1st Battalion, 166th Infantry, the first unit to arrive on the scene, started by making a sweep of High Street where the afternoon rioting had taken place. The sweep was not resisted because by the time it started, at about 11:30 p.m., the disturbance had long subsided, due in no small part to the mayor's prompt imposition of a curfew which had led to some 200 arrests earlier in the evening. The sweep did announce the presence of the Guard to the students. The Guard commander, Brigadier General George F. Graf, established his command post at the headquarters of the campus police where he was joined by representatives of the Highway Patrol, Columbus Police Department, Ohio Fire Marshal, and the FBI. Representatives of the mayor's office and the university president, who together constituted civil authority, also joined the command post. After the sweep, Guardsmen established checkpoints around and within the campus proper as an effort to assert control by appearances, there being too few troops to establish a proper cordon. Sentries guarded key facilities such as the Administration Building, the power plant and the fire department. Joint Guard-police patrols prowled the campus and surrounding neighborhoods. Nearby units of the Columbus Fire Department each received a team of Guardsmen (4-5 men) for protection if called to the campus. Each of these actions was consistent with OARNG experience to date.

On April 30, some 4,000 students rallied on the Oval beginning at 10:00 a.m. Again, they listened to inflammatory speeches and then formed two groups, the smaller moving to 15th Avenue where it blocked traffic, and the larger moving to the Administration Building where it intended to present a new list of demands to university officials. Those officials read the "Riot Act," a formal, legal order to disperse, over a loud-speaker and, after allowing several minutes for the students to comply, ordered the assembled Guard units to disperse the crowd. Pre-positioned units of the 1-166 Infantry and the 1-136 Artillery fired tear gas into the crowd and forced it back on to and across the Oval with massed riot control formations and fixed bayonets. Because the Oval is a very wide and open area, many students merely slipped around the flanks of the Guard formations and regrouped behind them. It took three separate passes across the Oval to finally disperse the crowd, and then the decisive element probably was the tear gas. Meanwhile, a smaller force of Guardsmen and city police enjoyed better success at moving demonstrators out of the 15th Avenue area.

These operations were a significant departure from the Guard's experience in civil disturbance control. Not since the labor disputes of the 1930s had the Guard employed massed company- and battalion-size formations. Such formations had been consistently de-emphasized in both Army and OARNG doctrine through the 1960s. Their use on

April 30 reflected the university administration's concern that if the students were not dispersed, a repetition of the previous day's rioting would ensue, a concern not wholly unreasonable. Although inexperience and topography conspired against an efficient dispersal operation, the Guard accomplished its mission: the Administration Building was unharmed, the unlawful assembly was dispersed, and no rioting such as had occurred the previous day took place. No one was injured seriously. This was attributable to the control which the Guard and police had established over the campus and surrounding neighborhoods. When 3,500 students reassembled on the Oval that night in clear violation of a city and university curfew, it took only the arrival of a few Guard companies to persuade the students to leave. A Guard officer sensibly announced a one-hour extension of the curfew to accommodate the students' departure, after which troops would sweep the Oval. The crowd broke up without incident. This event argues that the students had indeed been impressed by the Guard's earlier demonstration of its capacity to handle crowds.

Good sense and cooperation on the part of Guard officers, police, and city and university officials combined to restore order to the university between Friday, May 1, and Monday, May 4. City police and Highway Patrol units, which were very unpopular with the students, withdrew from the campus on April 30. This left security in the hands of

the campus police and the Guard. Volunteer committees of faculty members and students made strenuous efforts to argue against violence and to find some common ground for negotiation between the dissident leadership and the administration. The administration allowed daily rallies on the Oval as long as students confined their activities elsewhere to peaceful picketing. This decision largely obviated the need for more massed formations by the Guard.¹²⁸ Both the mayor and the university president agreed on the time for a nightly curfew which was aggressively enforced both on and off-campus. The Guard maintained its sentries, checkpoints and patrols, but otherwise tried to keep large bodies of troops out of sight. That the potential for more disturbances was waning by Monday, May 4, is evidenced by the absence of any significant disturbances between May 1 and May 4, the significantly smaller group of students (1,500) attracted to the rally on May 4, and the noticeable return of most students to regular classes on May 4 despite the continuation of the boycott. All of this occurred despite the announcement on Friday, May 1, by President Richard Nixon that United States troops had entered Cambodia and despite the call on May 4 by student activist organizations for a nationwide student strike in protest. News of the tragic deaths of four students at Kent State University on May 4 applied a grim coup-de-grace to popular support for activism at OSU. On May 5, student government leaders

withdrew their support of the boycott. Between May 4 and the closing of the university on May 7, dissident activity was more provocative, including the physical barricading of university buildings, interruption of food service facilities, and fire-bombing. However, a distinct minority of radicals committed these acts and in most cases they were firmly and effectively countered by Guard troops.

Ohio State University closed on May 7 in response to a recommendation to do so from Governor Rhodes. That recommendation stemmed directly from the worst incident in Ohio Army National Guard history: the killings at Kent State University.

Violence erupted at Kent State on the night of Friday, May 1, as a reaction on the part of student dissidents to Nixon's announcement about Cambodia. Students and other demonstrators congregated on the main street of the city of Kent, damaging store fronts and refusing police orders to disperse. Some threatened to burn down business establishments which did not display signs protesting the Cambodian incursion. Others built a fire in the middle of Main Street. Still others pelted passing automobiles with rocks and blocked intersections. Police regained control of the town as the disturbance subsided in the early morning hours of May 2, but disturbances continued on campus that day. After considerable deliberation, the mayor of Kent

and university officials agreed to request Guard assistance late Saturday afternoon. As the first troops arrived that night, students set fire to the university ROTC building. Only strenuous efforts by two Guard companies cleared the rock-throwing mob sufficiently to allow the Kent Fire Department to fight the blaze. The building burned to the ground anyway, and several Guardsmen were injured in the process.¹²⁹

Throughout the next day Guardsmen patrolled the city, augmented local police and guarded important municipal facilities. On campus, they guarded the university gates and the charred ruins of the ROTC building. They did not actually occupy the campus as Guard troops had at OSU because of the reluctance of the university administration to let them do so and their own unwillingness to assert control in the absence of martial law. That night they assisted in enforcing the campus curfew, which was different from the curfew in Kent, testimony to the general lack of coordination between the various components of civil authority.

On Monday, May 4, approximately 100 Guardsmen representing three companies stood in formation near the ROTC ruins. With them were several officers, including Brigadier General Robert Canterbury, Assistant Adjutant General of Ohio. Facing them across a long, open, gently rising plain which led to the campus proper were several hundred students in what Canterbury believed was an unauthorized

assembly. Canterbury had a campus policeman order this group to disperse. The policeman rode up and down the edges of the group in a Guard jeep and gave his order over a bullhorn. The group did not respond. As classes ended at about 11:50 a.m., the group of students grew larger. Some appeared to be preparing for a noon rally for which dissident leaders had called. Canterbury thereupon decided to forcefully disperse the crowd with the troops. He gave orders to the three company commanders who each selected a part of their companies to participate, the remainder being left behind to guard the ROTC building. The soldiers put on gas masks, fired tear gas into the crowd and advanced on the students, some seventy-five officers and men in three company lines abreast against a crowd of perhaps as many as 2,000.

Jeering and throwing rocks defiantly, the crowd withdrew grudgingly before the troops. Halfway across the plain, one company of Guardsmen split away from the main body and moved to the left to go around the first building and set up a "blocking position" on its far side. The other two companies drove the crowd across the central campus, down a gentle slope past the blocking position, and on to and across an athletic field and parking lot. Here both parties stopped for several minutes in an apparent stand-off. The crowd threw debris at the Guardsmen. The Guardsmen, woefully outnumbered and in an open field nearly surrounded

by taunting students, ominously assumed kneeling positions and aimed their rifles directly at their antagonists. After a few minutes in this position, they recovered and began a slow withdrawal back up the slope toward the central campus. Near the crest of the slope, very suddenly, one group of Guardsmen wheeled around and fired into the crowd. Thirteen bullets struck home; of these, four killed students instantly.

There is great controversy over why the Guardsmen fired. Some claim that they were fired upon by a sniper; others, that they were ordered to fire; still others, that they viciously conspired among each other to teach the students a lesson; yet others, that they panicked in their retreat before the mob.¹³⁰ Perhaps the recently released reports of investigations conducted by several agencies will shed light on these as yet unanswered questions. From the brief description of events offered here and in light of the OARNG's civil disturbance experience up to Kent State, one can draw several conclusions.

First, the Guard did not enjoy general control of the campus as they had in every civil disturbance since the Hough riots in 1966. This was because of the general lack of coordination and cooperation on the parts of civil authorities. There were no rationally designed checkpoints, sentry posts or patrol routes on campus. Worse, officials everywhere were unclear as to what rules applied to the

campus and who was responsible for enforcing them. Canterbury thus acted on his own judgment when he led the Guardsmen against the crowd. No administration officials, police or other Guard units were ready to support his move. By way of contrast, at OSU complete civil-military cooperation allowed the Guard to gain an important psychological advantage by quickly occupying the whole campus. When Guardsmen moved against crowds of demonstrators on April 30, they did so at the express order of civilian officials for the specific purpose of moving a clearly unlawful assembly of demonstrators away from buildings which had earlier been significantly damaged by a similar mob. When they moved, other Guard and police units were in position to support their movement by channeling the crowd dispersal and selectively arresting those who resisted the effort. Such control obviated any need for deadly force and any opportunity for accident or panic. After this operation, OSU officials and the Guard agreed that rallies and demonstrations, if confined to the Oval, were basically harmless and would be allowed. This important adaptation to campus disorders at once provided an outlet for student emotions, relieved the Guard of crowd control and dispersal duties on unfavorable terrain, and provided an opportunity for students who did not want to demonstrate to avoid entanglement with the crowd. After April 30, Guard operations were carefully integrated with administration, student and police

efforts to restore order. It was just this lack of integrated, comprehensive, purposeful, controlled effort at Kent State which allowed the explosive situation on May 4 to develop.

Second, Canterbury led far too few troops against the crowd at Kent State. Assuming that the decision to move was sound and/or necessary, which it was not under the conditions, it still should not have been undertaken with the 60-70 troops available to the general. At OSU, two full battalions, some 500 men, plus supporting police were deployed against a crowd of similar size. It should have been obvious to Guard leaders at Kent State that they could not "disperse" so large a gathering in an unsupported operation with so few troops. If the crowd resisted, tragedy could well ensue. If the crowd moved, the troops could not follow them indefinitely and would therefore have to withdraw eventually, admitting their own impotence. If the crowd indeed threatened the hundred or so Guardsmen drawn up in front of the ROTC building, an orderly withdrawal on their part would have been a far wiser course of action. General Canterbury's decision to move against the crowd on May 4 was radically inconsistent with Guard experience and doctrine to date. It was an independent and unannounced decision despite long-standing Guard emphasis on cooperation with civil authority. It employed a tragically inadequate number of soldiers despite the Guard's philosophy of employing overwhelming numbers of

troops to gain control. It required massed unit formations despite five years of deemphasis of those formations and Guard reluctance to resort to them.

Third, OARNG policy of carrying loaded weapons into civil disturbances finally bore its evil fruit. It is likely that if the Guardsmen had been adhering to U.S. Army doctrine, they would not have fired into the crowd. That doctrine called for loading weapons only as a conscious, deliberate step in the escalation of the use of force. It was a step to be taken only on explicit order and in the face of evident danger.¹³¹ All accounts of Kent State agree to the suddenness of the Guardsmen's turning and firing. Such suddenness would not have been possible had the Guardsmen had to load their rifles first. Such loading probably would not have taken place without an explicit order, and if it did, the officers would have had time to gain control before any shooting took place. If in fact there was a danger from snipers, one or two selected marksmen with loaded weapons, alert for snipers and not mesmerized by the crowd, and under the direct, personal control of the commander, as called for by Army doctrine, would have provided sufficient, even superior, protection. Up until Kent State, Ohio Guardsmen had demonstrated commendable restraint in handling loaded firearms. That was because they were properly deployed, performing rational missions, and under the strict control of their officers

and, in turn, civilian authorities. When those conditions were missing, as at Kent State, there was no procedural safeguard against impulsive use of firepower for whatever reason. OARNG policy on the use of deadly force combined with the confused conditions at Kent State and the poor judgment of General Canterbury to produce a tragedy of the worst kind.

The deployment of Guard troops to both campuses in the spring of 1970 was consistent with OARNG policy, the policy of Governor Rhodes and Army doctrine, all of which stressed that early and massive commitment of troops to a civil disturbance is likely to preclude damage and injury. Conditions at both campuses warranted deployment of Guard troops. However, campaign rhetoric left Governor Rhodes no option to the use of troops.

In May, 1970, the Governor sought his party's nomination to the United States Senate. Primary elections were to be held on May 5. In a debate on April 21, his opponent, Representative Robert Taft, Jr., called Rhodes' precautionary alert of OARNG troops during campus disorders a dangerous over-reaction which could have resulted in riots and university closings. Rhodes replied that the action was necessary to preclude damage and injury and that his philosophy was and would be to move quickly with force to stop violence.¹³² He thereby publicly committed himself to

a specific course of action and placed high political stakes on the success or failure of such action. He was determined to keep the state universities open and to use troops to do so if necessary. He reiterated these positions during a visit to Kent State on May 3. The killings occurred on May 4. On May 5, the Governor lost the primary election to Taft, and on May 6, he reversed his position and recommended that presidents of state universities close their institutions to prevent further violence.

Too much can be made of this sequence of events. Undoubtedly the Governor exploited events rhetorically to favor his own position in the campaign, as is the wont of politicians. Undoubtedly he no longer had a political stake in the outcome of the campus disturbances after May 5. Given the situation on the campuses that spring and given Ohio's approach to civil disturbance control as it had developed since 1965, Governor Rhodes probably would have acted no differently had there been no election. He would have sought to keep the universities open by sending in troops when so requested, he would have disagreed, but not interfered directly, with the reluctance of Kent State officials to use the troops more effectively, and he would have recommended closing the universities rather than risk further violence after the tragedy there. Certainly OARNG commanders knew how important it was to their commander-in-chief that they successfully and quickly bring order to

the campuses. However, nothing about the operations at Kent State or Ohio State indicates that Guard officers acted in a certain way simply because of Rhodes' political position. The notion that Canterbury and the officers under him were inspired by Rhodes' rhetoric to act aggressively is plausible but as yet unsupported by evidence.¹³³ Military operations, and especially the operations of National Guard units under state control, always have a political context and, indeed, cannot be understood without an appreciation for that context. In 1970, in Ohio, that context was the long-standing policy of the Governor to commit troops promptly when requested to do so and to urge local authority to make their requests early rather than late. That Guard operations were cynically manipulated by the Governor to bolster his campaign neither follows from the events themselves nor is substantiated by any available evidence.

Perhaps the tragedy at Kent State could have been prevented had someone other than Canterbury been the commander there. One recalls how skillfully General Del Corso handled the reluctance of civilian officials to use troops in the preferred manner at Cleveland in 1968. Why did he not assume control of events at Kent State?

Del Corso had his hands full elsewhere. Throughout the month of April, a "wildcat" truckers' strike had plagued Ohio and especially the cities of Cleveland, Akron and

Cincinnati. By the end of the month, stocks of vital supplies such as medical supplies for hospitals and food were dwindling. Strikers used violence against independent truckers and union drivers who did not strike. Terminals in the three cities were scenes of disorder. Bands of vigilantes attacked trucks along the interstate highways. On April 28, the mayor of Cleveland requested Guard assistance in protecting terminals and truck routes within the city. Rhodes granted the request and offered Guard help to other Ohio cities effected by the strike. When Akron and Cincinnati accepted the offer, Rhodes further authorized the use of Guard troops to reinforce the Highway Patrol and protect the major highways between those cities.¹³⁴

In response to this mission, the OARNG mobilized some 4,000 troops on April 29. They occupied truck terminals escorted truck convoys, guarded highway overpasses, and patrolled the interstate highways in jeeps and helicopters. While Del Corso did not personally command this effort, he conferred with Guard and civilian officials in each of the major cities and controlled operations through the EOH. With 2,500 Guardsmen at OSU, another 4,000 patrolling the highways, and 1,200 at Kent State, Del Corso simply did not have a reasonable opportunity to assume personal direction of operations anywhere. That he appointed his Assistant Adjutant General commander of troops at Kent State and his Chief of Staff, Colonel Clem, commander at

OSU, both of whom had considerable experience in command of civil disturbance control operations, testifies to the importance he attached to those institutions. That all of these troops were properly alerted, deployed, supported, and withdrawn when no longer needed demonstrates that the OARNG, through its initiatives since 1965, had acquired an impressive capability for responding to state emergencies generally and civil disturbances specifically.

The truckers' strike ended on May 5, relieving the Guard of its highway patrol duties. On May 7, both Ohio State University and Kent State University closed and by May 9 all Guardsmen had been withdrawn from both campuses. On May 15, disturbances at Ohio University in Athens prompted the administration there to request Guard assistance. Officials then decided to close the university rather than risk violence and the 2,000 Guardsmen sent there merely provided security while the students packed and departed. OSU reopened on May 20 and on May 21 a very small group of dissidents (about 250) rioted on High Street. They caused grievous damage to businesses there before being dispersed by police. Fearing a repetition of their earlier experience, university and city officials called for Guard assistance.

The prompt deployment of six battalions and four smaller units made OSU an armed camp overnight. Clamping a cordon around the university and firmly controlling the

campus with patrols and sentries, the Guard successfully deterred any reoccurrence of student violence. The dissidents clearly could no longer marshal mass support for confrontation tactics. Encouraged by several partial concessions to student concerns, including the establishment of an Office for Minority Affairs, dissident leaders entered talks with university officials on May 28 as the vast majority of students went home for the Memorial Day weekend. The last Guard units withdrew that day also and an era ended. Guardsmen made one last appearance on Ohio's streets in August, 1970, when racial disturbances broke out in Lima. In contrast to what had gone before, the incident was minor, requiring only 600 troops. Since then, the Ohio Army National Guard has not been called to the aid of civil authority in a civil disturbance role.

CHAPTER VI

Between 1965 and 1970, the Ohio Army National Guard demonstrated that it was an effective instrument of state law enforcement. Of the fifteen incidents during those years when Guard troops were committed to a civil disturbance in an active role, eleven times their arrival clearly marked the point at which riotous anarchy became contained social protest. The exceptions are Russell's Point and Geneva-on-the-Lake in 1965 when troops arrived after the disturbance had subsided; the Hough riot in Cleveland in 1966 when inexperience on the parts of civilian and military leaders allowed misemployment of troops in a reactive role unsupported by civilian initiative; and Kent State University in 1970 when civilian indecision, military misjudgment, and Guard policy on deadly force combined tragically in the deaths of four students. At Dayton in 1966, Cincinnati and Central State College in 1967, Cincinnati, Youngstown and Cleveland in 1968, Youngstown and Columbus in 1969, and Ohio State University, Lima and the truckers' strike at Akron, Cincinnati and Cleveland in 1970, the OARNG successfully stopped and deterred violence and protected life and property with scrupulous regard for the law and without

inflicting serious injury or death on anyone. While the effect of precautionary mobilizations is difficult to judge, one must add to this record that on another ten occasions during those years, Guard troops assembled but were not committed.

This long record of successful service to the State of Ohio was the result of deliberate planning and preparation by Guard officers. Taking their cue from Guard mobilizations in Alabama and Mississippi in the early 1960s, and especially from the experience of the California National Guard at Watts in 1965, they established institutions, procedures and contingency plans for handling disturbances in Ohio. The LNO system, task force area organization of the state, predesignation of commanders and units, the Military Support to Civil Authorities Section and the EOH all proved effective during emergencies throughout the decade. Guard intelligence operations and Colonel Clem's careful dissection of Colonel Canterbury's experience at Hough both illustrate that the Guard aggressively sought to improve its civil disturbance control capability. By 1967, when public furor over Guard performance at Detroit and Newark prompted the Federal government to intervene in civil disturbance control planning, the OARNG already had well-established programs which anticipated Federal reforms. Those reforms altered the pace and form, but not the substance, of Guard preparations in Ohio. Despite the

turbulence created in the Guard by Federal initiatives, and especially the McNamara reorganization in early 1968, Ohio Guard units performed well in the disturbances following the King assassination.

The OARNG's collective experience in civil disturbance control was first codified in a comprehensive doctrinal statement as OPLAN 2 in 1969. This plan took as its model of a civil disturbance the ghetto riots which had plagued the nation ever since Watts. It emphasized tactics of intimidation through show of force, area control, and appropriate responses to low-level violence such as sniper fire. It deemphasized crowd control and dispersal tactics more appropriate to the classical notion of a riot as a surging mob. While this accurately reflected OARNG experience to date, it blinded OARNG officers to the possibilities of civil disturbances in other areas according to other formats. Thus, despite the increasing frequency of campus disturbances beginning in 1967, OARNG officers made no efforts to establish liaison with university officials as they had with city officials, nor did they consider whether the doctrine espoused in OPLAN 2 was applicable to campus disorders. When they were confronted with disturbances on the campuses in 1970, they and university officials were unsure of how to respond. At Ohio State University, civil-military cooperation resulted in quick adaptation of tactics and an integrated effort which restored order to

the point where civilian authority could take steps to remove the causes of disorder. At Kent State University, the absence of civil-military cooperation resulted in confusion, reaction and death.

No part of OPLAN 2 is as vulnerable to criticism as the doctrine it espoused for the use of deadly force. Guard officers defended that doctrine and especially the policy of carrying loaded weapons into civil disturbances as necessary for the protection of the troops. In their defense, one must agree that civil disturbances are inherently dangerous and justify concern for the safety of the soldier. Further, the OARNG demonstrated remarkably good discipline and restraint in its use of deadly force generally. This very discipline and restraint argues against the case for loaded weapons, however. An organization as well-disciplined, controlled and trained as the OARNG proved itself to be should have had no trouble responding quickly and effectively to real threats to its soldiers from sniper fire or other types of violence. To have every soldier carry a loaded weapon despite Army doctrine to the contrary and despite the example of Detroit was to invite accident and disaster. Indeed, any officer with experience leading troops should have readily recognized the potential danger. That the OARNG persisted in this unreasonable policy was one of three major causes of the tragedy at Kent State. It is the strongest criticism one can make of OARNG doctrine and

performance between 1965 and 1970.

Closely related to the issue of deadly force is that of equipment. If Guardsmen had carried shotguns instead of rifles, the incidents at Kent State and the roadblock in Hough in 1966 would not have been so terrible. In both of those incidents, however, the more important causes were poor policy, confusion, and poor leadership on the spot. In most other instances of OARNG civil disturbance control, the Guard was able to rely on its standard Army equipment. The one significant exception was the poor performance of the Guard's tactical radios in urban areas. Sensitive to erosion of the Guard's status as a combat organization, OARNG officers probably would not have been enthusiastic about acquiring large amounts of riot control equipment anyway. Nor would there have been agreement on whether the state or federal government should bear the costs of such equipment. In a classical case of hindsight, the OARNG requested procurement of special riot control equipment in October, 1970, and in 1971, Ohio and the federal government agreed on division of the costs. In 1972, the OARNG received a packet of special equipment including high-powered sniper rifles with sophisticated sights, movie cameras, 5,000 pairs of handcuffs, 7,000 pieces of body armor, public address systems, floodlights, 500 shotguns and much more.¹³⁵ Procured on the not unreasonable notion that the government should afford the soldier

more protection while arming him with less lethal weapons, this equipment has lain dormant for more than ten years.

Another important aspect of OARNG operations during the late 1960s is civil-military relations. Part of the OARNG experience seems to warrant traditional American suspicion of military institutions. The OARNG staff sought to alter the laws of Ohio in 1966 to give Guard officers more authority during civil disturbance control operations. The implication is clear that they were willing to use their formal and informal political connections to accomplish this. Guard intelligence efforts included the "monitoring" by Guard officers, usually in civilian clothes, of labor disputes, political demonstrations, and other lawful activities which seemed to carry the potential for trouble. At OSU in 1970, Guard officers ordered Guardsmen who were also registered students to remain on campus and report on dissident activities.¹³⁶ Guard officers sought to control press access to their areas of operations. The LNO system represented a remarkable degree of military-police integration. None of this, however, should be interpreted as a conscious effort at subversion of civil control of the military nor as government collusion aimed at establishing a police state. Each of these efforts was a separate and reasonable institutional response to the constitutionally imposed mission of aiding civil authority during disturbances. That they could have resulted in a dangerous

though unintended accumulation of power in time of crisis is evident. That some of them were perhaps excessive and should be constrained by law is arguable. Continued civilian skepticism and scrutiny of Guard policies and activities is justified. On the other hand, traditional suspicion must be balanced with an appreciation for the Guard's role in a civil disturbance.

The Guard is an aid to civil authority. Civil authority remains responsible for restoring order and protecting life and property. In no case in Ohio during 1965-1970 did the federal government intervene nor did the Governor declare martial law. In every case, local civil authority requested Guard troops. Thus, Guard operations were always subordinated to the lowest reasonable level of civil government, usually the local mayor. Guard officers accepted this subordination. They worked hard to integrate the capabilities of their organization with those of the civil government to produce a comprehensive effort at restoring order. The LNO system, the periodic meetings with civil officials, and the week-end training clinics in the summer and fall of 1968 all were efforts to enhance mutual understanding and cooperation between local, elected, civilian officials and military officers. Dayton in 1966, Youngstown in 1968, and Ohio State University in 1970 are all outstanding examples of effective civil-military cooperation with no loss of civil control. Cleveland in 1968 is an excellent example of Guard

subordination to local authority even in a case where the senior officer of the state disagreed strongly with that authority's plans. If Kent State is one incident of Guard impulsiveness when disconnected from civilian control, it also demonstrates the reluctance of Guard officers to assume authority broader than that granted it by local officials.¹³⁷ Never did Guard operations extend beyond the geographic area needed to control the immediate disturbance. Guard troops almost always withdrew promptly after restoration of order. A less direct but no less important element of civil control is represented by the federal initiatives in response to the public outcry in 1967. The OARNG became subject to public scrutiny in the press and detailed examination of its every aspect by federal officials. All of this argues that the OARNG neither by intent nor in effect represented a threat to civilian control of the military, the authority of civil government or the liberties of the general public. Indeed, Guardsmen were civilians themselves, often residents of the areas in which they were called to serve, and so were even more likely to be responsive to local civil control.

Another dimension of civil-military relations is politics. To the degree that the Guard was subordinate to local civil authority, it was subordinate to the political interests of that authority. In this sense, Guard operations are inseparable from their political context. Civil

government must always weigh the political costs of summoning the Guard against the costs of possible continued disorder. Guard operations are always a compromise of some sort between the tactical concerns of the military commander and the political concerns of his civilian superiors.

No better example can be cited than the operations at Cleveland in 1968. Tactically, the Guard should have remained in control of the Glenville-Hough area. Politically, Mayor Stokes believed the withdrawal of the Guard to be a symbolic gesture critical to the continued legitimacy of his administration. The continued legitimacy of civil government is the whole issue in civil disturbance control operations. After slight adjustments which acknowledged the commander's responsibility for the welfare of his troops, Guard units, quite rightfully, were withdrawn.

Political conditions strongly influence whether troops are committed, the manner of their operations, and the length of their deployment. Politicians always have a vested interest in the outcome of Guard operations. Both Rhodes and Taft publicly committed themselves to certain positions on the use of the Guard on the campuses in 1970. There is no evidence, however, to indicate that the constitutional safeguards against capricious use of the National Guard were ever violated or that Guard officers ever conducted themselves in a certain manner due to their own personal political preferences. That Guard operations in Ohio had a

political dimension is inherent to the nature of civil disturbance control. That they were planned and conducted to further the political fortunes of any candidate or party is not supported by the evidence.

The Ohio Army National Guard is permanently associated in the national psyche with the tragedy at Kent State University, an event which obscures with its powerful symbolism the fact that Ohioans were well served by their fellow citizens in uniform between 1965 and 1970. While there is no denying the Guard's share of the blame for the tragedy at Kent State, there is no justice in attributing to the Guard all of that blame. Further, what happened at Kent State must be seen in the context of what happened during the entire latter half of the 1960s. Examination of that period shows the Guard consistently providing decisive aid to civil authorities attempting to restore order. The Guard stopped and deterred violence. It protected life and property. Its leaders aggressively pursued institutional and doctrinal improvement to enhance its operational capabilities. They scrupulously adhered to the laws which constrained their activities. They conscientiously cooperated with all levels of civil government even when to do so was contrary to their preference. The Ohio Army National Guard was indeed proficient at civil disturbance control at least from 1967 through the end of the decade.

It did not bring about an end to the causes of social protest in the 1960s. In Ohio, it did help to contain that protest within legal and non-violent bounds until civil government and society could respond to the demands of the disaffected. This record argues persuasively that the Ohio Army National Guard was an effective, reliable and appropriate instrument of responsible democratic government.

NOTES

1. Ohio, Constitution, art. 9, sec. 4.
2. Ohio, Adjutant General's Department, Annual Report of the Adjutant General of Ohio, 1965, p. 9. See also annual reports for 1966 through 1970. Annual reports hereafter cited as "AG Reports" and year.
3. Ohio, Ohio Revised Code 1980, paras. 5923.21, 5923.22, 5923.23, 5923.231. Except as noted hereafter in the text, these paragraphs were in effect between 1965 and 1970.
4. Robert W. Coakley, "Federal Use of Militia and the National Guard in Civil Disturbances: The Whiskey Rebellion to Little Rock," in Bayonets in the Streets, ed. Robin Higham (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1969), pp. 30-31.
5. Ohio, AG Report 1965, pp. 23-24; interview with Major General James C. Clem, Ohio National Guard, 10 September 1981. Clem was commander of the 371st Artillery Group and the Southwest Area Task Force, 1964-1967; Chief of Staff of the Ohio Army National Guard, 1967-1971; and had been Adjutant General of Ohio since 1974.
6. Washington Post, 14 August 1966. An editorial by John Maffre suggests that the Guard as a whole concluded from the Mississippi and Alabama experiences that it was well prepared for civil disturbances.
7. Ohio, AG Report 1964, p. 14.
8. Milton Viorst, Fire in the Streets: America in the 1960's, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), p. 282, p. 306. That American youth were effected by Vietnam as early as 1965 is further evidenced by an increase in National Guard enlistments for that year which a Guard general specifically attributes to the war. Ohio, AG Report 1965, p. 1.
9. Sergeant D.W. Bennett to Robert W. Traver, Chief, Sandusky Police Department, Sandusky, Ohio, 12 July 1965. AG files, Ohio Historical Society, hereafter AG-OHS.
10. The 1-137 Armor deployed as an infantry unit, that is,

without its tanks. All units mentioned herein deployed as infantry and without the heavy weapons and other equipment implied by their type. Frequently, they had a few armored personnel carriers borrowed from other units.

11. Lieutenant Colonel Francis E. Johnson, Jr., to Adjutant General of Ohio, "Summary of Active Duty (State)," 6 July 1965, AG-OHS.
12. Captain Lee J. Harmer to Senior Army Advisor, Ohio Army National Guard, "State Active Duty for 1/137 Armor," 8 July 1965, p. 1, AG-OHS; assigned strength figures were taken from AG Report 1965, p. 4.
13. Johnson to Adjutant General, 6 July 1965.
14. Harrer to Senior Army Advisor, 8 July 1965.
15. Captain Michel R. Antaya to Commanding Officer, USA Advisory Group (NG) Ohio, "Civil Disturbance Alert Report," 9 July 1965, p. 1, AG-OHS.
16. Lieutenant Colonel Warren E. Nossaman to Senior Army Advisor, US Army Adv Gp (NG) Ohio, "Civil Disturbance Duty," 13 July 1965, p. 2, AG-OHS.
17. Ibid., p. 1.
18. Viorst, Fire in the Streets, pp. 309-341. For the military operations I have relied upon Higham (ed.), Bayonets, pp. 101-109 and a presentation given by Major Generals Roderic Hill and Charles Ott, California National Guard, to the 87th General Conference of the National Guard Association of the United States on 29 September 1965, the text of which is in the conference Official Proceedings, pp. 159-167. I cite these now to avoid repetitious citation hereafter.
19. There are contradictory accounts of the causes of death. Viorst gives the total number killed as 34 (p. 311) and later asserts that "...no policeman or fireman was killed by sniper fire and it is not clear that any were even struck." (p. 366). He does not cite his sources. Major General Ott, speaking only six weeks after the events, implies that the policemen and the firemen were killed by sniper fire. While showing slides of confiscated weapons, he said, "Very fortunately, they were not good shots. There were two policemen and a fireman killed," and later, "...there

was just an awful lot of ammunition fired at the military and police." No sources which I have seen disputes that people were shooting at the Guard and the police.

20. Interview with Colonel (retired) Frank Ruvio, Jr., Ohio Army National Guard, 13 August 1981. Ruvio was G-3 and Director of Military Support to Civil Authorities of the OARNG from 1968 to 1971.
21. Major General Erwin C. Hostetler to selected officers, "Liaison Visit with Police Chiefs, County Sheriffs, Mayors and Prosecuting Attorneys to Major Ohio Cities," 27 August 1965, p. 1, AG-OHS. The cities were Akron, Bellefontaine, Canton, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton, Geneva-on-the-Lake, Hamilton, Middletown, Russell's Point, Springfield, Toledo, and Youngstown.
22. Ohio, Adjutant General's Department, 1000-Day Report: August 1965 - June 1968, p. 2; interview with Clem, 10 September 1981.
23. Colonel Robert H. Canterbury to Major General Erwin C. Hostetler, "Report on Civil Disturbance Meetings Conducted 31 August and 1 September 1965," 3 September 1965, p. 1; Canterbury to Hostetler, "Meeting with City Officials at Middletown, Ohio on Riot Control," 9 September 1965, p. 1; Lieutenant Colonel Thomas A. Herzog to Hostetler, "Liaison Visit with Chief of Police - Toledo, Ohio," 16 September 1965, Colonel James C. Clem to Hostetler, "Briefing of Civil Authorities on Military Assistance to Civil Authorities," 3 September 1965; Brigadier General Heber L. Minton to Hostetler, "Liaison Visits - Youngstown - Geneva-on-the-Lake," 2 September 1965, AG-OHS.
24. Ibid.
25. Martial rule as opposed to martial law. The former in this context means military aid to civil authority where that authority remains supreme. Martial law means displacement of the civil government by soldiers acting directly under the governor.
26. Canterbury to Hostetler, 3 September 1965 and 9 September 1965.
27. By way of example, an officer of the 2d Battalion, 174th Artillery, was assigned as observer and liaison officer to local police agencies during a Ku Klux Klan rally at Cambridge, Ohio, between September 23, 1965, and September 26. He discussed contingency

plans with law enforcement officers, made a reconnaissance of various routes into the rally area, and observed the rally while it was in progress. In an interesting earlier episode, the 3d Battalion, 145th Infantry actually secretly encamped near the scene of a KKK rally in Medina County while the battalion and company commanders reconnoitered the rally vicinity. I was not able to determine the circumstances under which this assembly was authorized. Minton to Hostetler, "Cambridge KKK Meeting," 24 September 1965, AG-OHS.

28. Interview with Clem, 10 September 1981.
29. The cities were Sandusky, Cleveland and Akron. Bennett to Traver, 12 July 1965; Canterbury to Hostetler, 3 September 1965.
30. Herzog to Hostetler, 16 September 1965.
31. The officers' names are in the 87th General Conference of the National Guard Association of the United States Official Proceedings, pp. 212-213. They include Sylvester T. Del Corso, Adjutant General of Ohio 1968-1970, and thirteen other officers who held battalion or higher level commands or served in a primary position on the state staff between 1965 and 1970.
32. Ohio, AG Report 1967, p. 15.
33. J.E.P. McCann, "Turn Out the Guard: Riot Duty in Cleveland," The National Guardsman 20 (9 September 1966).
34. Interview with Clem, 10 September 1981.
35. Ibid; Hostetler to selected officers, 27 August 1965.
36. In 1967, a Department of the Army board found that there were 246 blacks among Ohio's 15,775 Guardsmen. U.S., Department of Defense, Participation of Negroes in the Reserve Components of the Army, 2 vols., 16 October 1967, 2:E-3; "Dayton Negro Guardsmen Top National Average," Dayton Journal Herald, clipping, undated, late summer 1967, AG-OHS. Lieutenant Colonel (retired) Lovell Tipton, Jr., OARNG, a black officer who was assistant G-3 for training of the OARNG from 1954 to 1967, asserts that the racial issue was not a matter of importance in the state's civil disturbance planning, Interview with Tipton, 3 September 1981.
37. Interview with Clem, 10 September 1981.

38. Ohio, Adjutant General's Department, AG Report 1966, pp. 9-10; "Improved Readiness for Selected Reserve Force," (AGO Circular 350-9), 9 November 1965, p. 1.
39. Staff Daily Journal, Adjutant General of Ohio, 19 July 1966, pp. 2-3; Minton, "AG Staff Conference and Assignment of Specific Tasks for Staff ref: Cleveland Disturbances," undated, attached to Staff Daily Journal, 19 July 1966, AG-OHS; McCann, "Turn Out the Guard."
40. McCann, "Turn Out the Guard."
41. Ibid.
42. Columbus Dispatch, 22, 23, 24 July 1966.
43. Columbus Dispatch, 21 July 1966; McCann, "Turn Out the Guard."
44. Staff Daily Journal, Adjutant General of Ohio, 19-27 July 1966, p. 12, AG-OHS; New York Times, 27 August 1967, p. 3.
45. Minton, "AG Staff Conference..." 19 July 1966; photographs of the Guard at Cleveland show machine guns mounted on jeeps. McCann, "Turn Out the Guard."
46. Columbus Dispatch, 23 July 1966; McCann, "Turn Out the Guard."
47. Washington Post, 14 August 1966. A federal official is quoted as saying, "I've always found that public officials feel it is a reflection on them if they have to call in outside help," p. E-3.
48. Columbus Dispatch, 1, 2, 3 September 1966. The military operations at Dayton are covered in great detail in Clem to Hostetler, "Final Report - National Guard Participation in Civil Disturbance at Dayton, 1-7 September 1966," 14 September 1966, AG-OHS.
49. Interview with Clem, 10 September 1966; Ohio, AG Report 1967, p. 26.
50. Clem to Hostetler, 14 September 1966, pp. 6-7.
51. There are twenty some such colored photographs filed under "Dayton Riot" in the uncatalogued Adjutant General records at the Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio. One photograph of a lieutenant with a cigarette dangling nonchalantly from his mouth has an angry

note from Hostetler appended to it, evidence that traditional military discipline was a matter of emphasis in the OARNG.

52. Lieutenant Colonel Ben Emery recorded Clem's instructions as he gave them. Staff Daily Journal, Headquarters, 371st Artillery Group (Air Defense), 1-2 September 1966, p. 7, AG-OHS. Clem attributes his soldiers' restraint to constant reminders to be careful and close supervision by officers of all activities. Interview with Clem, 10 September 1981.
53. Columbus Dispatch, 7, 8 September 1966.
54. Humphrey was reported as saying that if he had to live as some Americans lived in the ghettos, he might riot too. Columbus Dispatch, 6 September 1966.
55. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings Before a Special Subcommittee to Inquire into the Capability of the National Guard to Cope with Civil Disturbance, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, testimony of Undersecretary of the Army David E. McGiffert, p. 5865; Lieutenant Colonel J.E.P. McCann to Hostetler, 18 April 1967; Canterbury to Hostetler, "Possible Civil Disturbances," 26 April 1967; miscellaneous notes and memos appended thereto; Ohio, Adjutant General's Department, The Hough Riot, Cleveland, Ohio - The Report on the Role of the Ohio National Guard During the Hough Area Riots in Cleveland, 18-31 July 1966, 10 August 1966, pp. 16-19, AG-OHS.
56. Brigadier General William F. Morr to Hostetler, "Procedures and Checklist - Aid to Civil Authorities - Civil Disturbances," 9 September 1966, AG-OHS; Ohio, AG Reports 1967, p. 27.
57. Colonel Ralph G. Smith, Staff Judge Advocate of the OARNG, to Hostetler, "Legislative Amendments," 6 July 1966; Morr to Hostetler, "Legislative Amendments," 16 August 1966, AG-OHS.
58. U.S. National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 1 March 1968, pp. 54-55. Hereafter cited as NACCD, Report.
59. "A Crisis that Won't Go Away," Newsweek, 14 August 1967.
60. "Riot Control: Hold the Streets and Seize the 'High Ground,'" Time, 4 August 1967, p. 16; "It's Time to

Change the Guard," Time, 20 October 1967, p. 24.

61. Time, 4 August 1967, p. 16; Washington Post, 24 July 1967; Herschel C. Yeagen, "Considerations on the Use of the Army National Guard in Riot Control Operations: Mission, Organization and Training," (Student paper, U.S. Army War College, 20 February 1968), p. 29.
62. U.S., Department of the Army, "Riot Control," (Army Subject Schedule 19-6), 9 February 1965, pp. 2-3. There is evidence that not all states required the full 24 hours training. Newsweek magazine asserts that, "Most Guardsmen receive little more than six hours of riot drill..." Newsweek, 14 August 1967, p. 20. Hill stated in his presentation to the NGAUS, "CONARC directives...say that annually each member of the Guard ...will be given three hours of instruction in Civil Disturbance, Riot Control..." NGAUS 87th General Conference Official Proceedings, p. 159. The Army required 24 hours annually, but the degree to which the requirement was met varied between states and units.
63. My analysis of the Kerner Commission and the House subcommittee is based on U.S., NACCD, Report, and U.S., Congress, House, Hearings...., 90th Cong. See note 55. Martha Derthick's The National Guard in Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965) discusses the role of the National Guard Association and its relationship with the House. The subcommittee's interrogation of Throckmorton is in the Hearings. His conduct at Detroit was unassailable and I believe the subcommittee members knew that. They simply needed a whipping boy to draw attention away from the Guard. That Throckmorton took it gracefully is testimony to his professionalism. He received a fourth star and held two major army commands before his retirement in 1973. See also "Guard Criticized on Detroit Riots," New York Times, 23 August 1967, p. 1.
64. Otto Kerner to President Lyndon B. Johnson, 10 August 1967, reprinted in U.S., DOD, Participation, 2: Annex A. See also U.S., NACCD, Report, pp. 275-279. The subcommittee recommendations, published in January, 1968, concurred in the second and third recommendations of the Commission. Significantly, however, the subcommittee did not call for a review of officer records, but only of the promotion system. It completely avoided the issue of black representation in the Guard. See "AG Speaks," The Ohio Guardsman: The Quarterly Publication of Your Ohio National Guard Association, 34 (November, 1967, to January, 1968), p. 7.

65. President Lyndon B. Johnson to Secretary of Defense Robert M. McNamara, 10 August 1967, reprinted in U.S., DOD, Participation, 16 October 1967, 2: Annex A; see also, "A New Riot Memo is Given the Guard," New York Times, 6 August 1967, p. 51.
66. The Hollingsworth Board was officially so named after the officer tasked to be its head, Brigadier General James F. Hollingsworth. I have followed this precedent for convenience's sake in calling the untitled board tasked to study black participation in the reserves the "Williams Board," after its head, Brigadier General Robert M. Williams.
67. "A National Guard Shape-Up is Overdue," Life, 27 October 1967, p. 4. The term "undermanned" can be misleading. Almost all Guard units were at full authorized strength during the period studied here. Before 1968, many of these units were not authorized to enlist more than 50% of their wartime strength while others were authorized full wartime strength. The idea was that some units would be sent into combat immediately upon mobilization while others would follow later after filling up with new recruits. McNamara wanted to get rid of these "undermanned" units and consolidate their members into full-strength units so that all Guard units could be immediately deployed in an emergency.
68. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings..., 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, p. 5790. Hostetler based his objection to the McNamara reorganization on the grounds that loss of the division staff and support assets envisioned in the plan and reduction of the OARNG by some 2,000 soldiers would critically impair the Guard's ability to cope simultaneously with civil disturbances in several Ohio cities. Hostetler to Representative Mendel Rivers, "State Troop Structure Necessary to Cope with Civil Disturbances," 7 August 1967, in Hearings.
69. The contest between McNamara and the House was closely monitored in the press. The bulk of editorial comment seems to have supported McNamara on the belief that his reforms were necessary to improve the Guard's effectiveness at civil disturbance control as evidenced by Detroit. See "It's Time," Time, 20 October 1967, p. 25; "Shape-Up Overdue," Life, 27 October 1967, p. 4; "Guard Will Get 12,000 More Men," New York Times, 7 November 1967, p. 1; "The Guard vs. Insurrection," Ordnance, 52 (November-December 1967):289.

70. Address by Undersecretary of the Army David E. McGiffert to the NGAUS at its 89th General Conference, 18 September 1967, in the Official Proceedings, p. 60.
71. These barriers are discussed in U.S., DOD, Participation, and "Dayton Negro Guardsmen," Dayton Journal Herald, late summer 1967. Command Sergeant Mayor (retired) Wilbur Jones, OARNG, special minority recruiter for the OARNG in 1971 and a black soldier who joined the Guard in 1947, agrees. Interview with Jones, 24 August 1981. The integration of the OARNG between 1948 and the present is worthy of separate study. Ironically, integration called for elimination of the all-black units after the Korean War. The result was a drastic reduction in the total number of blacks in the Guard.
72. The upswing in Guard enlistments which paralleled the commitment of ground forces to Vietnam in 1965 is recorded in Ohio, AG Report 1965, p. 1. Clem agrees that the waiting lists would have been difficult, but not impossible, to manipulate. He also recalls that some commanders were reluctant to make an overt effort to attract blacks. Interview with Clem, 10 September 1981. Jones also believes that because of the recording and inspecting of the waiting lists that there was little room for manipulation. He stresses other social, educational and economic barriers to blacks. Interview with Jones, 24 August 1981. One black officer whom I interviewed believes strongly that family wealth and influence determined where one stood on the waiting list. All of these sources agree that whites dominated the lists almost exclusively. The remark of an OARNG recruiter in 1967 does much to tell us why the barriers to black participation were not overcome. Said he, "If they don't come forward, we can't draft them." Dayton Journal Herald, late summer 1967.
73. Interview with Ruvio, 13 August 1981. Del Corso's position on equal opportunity and minority recruiting is in an address he gave to the 1968 annual conference of the Ohio National Guard Association, the text of which is in the conference Official Proceedings, pp. 60-61.
74. Ohio, AG Report 1971, p. 9; interview with Jones, 24 August 1981; interview with Lieutenant Colonel Richard Alexander, OARNG, 19 August 1981. Alexander, a black, enlisted in the OARNG in 1960 and has served as a commissioned officer since 1962.
75. These figures came from the Equal Opportunity Office

of the Ohio Army National Guard, Beightler Armory, Worthington, Ohio.

76. "AG Speaks," The Ohio Guardsman, 33 (August - October 1967):2.
77. U.S., Department of the Army, Hollingsworth Report - Review of ARNG Federal Recognition Standards and Procedures and Promotion Procedures for Reserve Component Officers, 2 vols., 29 December 1967, 2:3-7 to 3-14. Major General Francis S. Greenlief addressing the 92d General Conference of the NGAUS, 14 September 1970, Official Proceedings, p. 60.
78. Ruvio remembers that Hollingsworth was difficult to talk to. He and Clem feel that many good officers left the Guard in the years after the Hollingsworth recommendations were implemented because they could not spare the time from their civilian jobs to attend mandatory Army schools within specified time limits. Interview with Ruvio, 13 August 1981 and interview with Clem, 10 September 1981. Officer losses for 1968 (199) and 1969 (196) were the highest of any year between 1966 and 1973. Mean annual loss over those years was 178. Ohio, AG Report 1967 through 1973.
79. U.S., Department of the Army, Hollingsworth Report, 2:3-14.
80. Brigadier General Robert H. Canterbury to Chief, National Guard Bureau, "Request for Approval of Reorganization Plan, Ohio National Guard," 27 December 1967, AG-OHS.
81. Ohio, AG Report 1968, p. 5. The numbers of units reorganized were generated by comparing the OARNG troop list in AG Report 1968 with that in AG Report 1967.
82. Interview with Ruvio, 13 August 1981; "Reorganization," The Ohio Guardsman, 34 (November 1967 - January 1968):1; "Pentagon Paragraphs," The National Guardsman, May 1968, p. 33.
83. Ohio, AG Report 1965, p. 26; 1000-Day Report, p. 6; AG Report 1968, p. 21; interview with Ruvio, 13 August 1981; "Riot Reaction Force: The Guard in the April Disorders," The National Guardsman, May 1968, p. 3.
84. Roger Beaumont, "The Embryonic Revolution: Perspectives on the 1967 Riots," in Bayonets, ed. Higham, p. 208.

85. Under intense grilling by the special subcommittee, Undersecretary of the Army David E. McGiffert, Chief of Staff of the Army General Ralph E. Haines, and Lieutenant General John Throckmorton spelled out the philosophical foundations of the new doctrine. Rioters were perceived as citizens, not enemies. The role of military forces was protection of life and property and restoration of order by using the authority manifest in military formations to deter violence and by using force incrementally and selectively against specifically identified threats to law and order. U.S., Congress, House, Hearings..., 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, pp. 5859-5897. Specific tactical features of the new doctrine were anticipated in the testimony of Major General Charles P. Stone, deputy commander at the Detroit riots in 1967, before the subcommittee. That testimony is reprinted in the Hearings and, with some inaccuracies, in Bayonets, ed. Higham, pp. 185-203.
86. "New Kind of War," Newsweek, 14 August 1967, p. 21.
87. New York Times, 6 August 1967; "It's Time," Time, 20 October 1967, p. 25.
88. Yeargen, "Considerations," p. 30. Another expression of the doctrine contained in these three documents is U.S., Department of the Army, "Operations Report - Lessons Learned, Civil Disorders 1967," 1 April 1968.
89. Compare U.S., Department of the Army, Civil Disturbances and Disasters, (Field Manual 19-15), December, 1964, with the same manual dated March 1968. Also, U.S., Department of the Army, "Riot Control," (Army Subject Schedule 19-6), 9 February 1965 with "Control of Civil Disturbances," (Army Subject Schedule 19-6), 21 February 1968. The latter document added nine hours of training to the annual requirement for all soldiers. It dropped three hours of classroom instruction and eight hours of squad and platoon formations and added one hour each of introduction, legal considerations, nature of civil disturbances, control measures and minimum force; two hours each of leadership responsibilities, formations, communications, anti-looting techniques, anti-sniping techniques, and anti-arson/fire fighter protection techniques; and required participation in a four-hour practical exercise.
90. Robin Higham, "Introduction," Bayonets, ed. Higham, p. 8; interview with Major General (retired) Sylvester T. Del Corso, Adjutant General of Ohio, 1968-1970, 1 December 1981; U.S., NACCD, Report, p. 270; Lemberg

Center for the Study of Violence, "April Aftermath of the King Assassination," Brandeis University, Waltham, Massachusetts, August, 1968, (mimeographed), p. 64.

91. Paul J. Scheips and M. Warner Stark, Use of Troops in Civil Disturbances Since World War II - Supplement II: 1967 (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1969), p. 5; interview with Del Corso, 1 December 1981.
92. U.S., Department of the Army, "Civil Disturbances," (Army Subject Schedule 19-6), 21 February 1968, pp. 2-3.
93. Hostetler to Representative F. Edward Hebert, 17 August 1967, in Hearings, pp. 6218-19; Major General Winston P. Wilson, Chief, National Guard Bureau, to Adjutants General, "After Action Report - Civil Disturbance Operations," 11 August 1967, which solicited state input to the doctrinal study; Canterbury to Chief, National Guard Bureau, same topic, 24 August 1967, the OARNG's reply which specified the policy of carrying loaded firearms, AG-OHS.
94. Interview with Ruvio, 13 August 1981; "AG Speaks," The Ohio Guardsman, 35 (February - April 1968), p. 7; Ohio, 1000-Day Report, pp. 3-4; Lieutenant General George R. Mather addressing the 90th General Conference, NGAUS, 8 October 1968, in Official Proceedings, p. 102.
95. Mather at NGAUS 90th Conference, Official Proceedings, p. 98; Major General James F. Cantwell, introducing Mather, *ibid.*, p. 96; U.S., Department of the Army, "Operations," 1 April 1968, p. 3; interview with Ruvio, 13 August 1981; Colonel Carl A. Peterson, Deputy Chief of Staff - Intelligence, 1st United States Army, to Hostetler, "Planning for Civil Disturbances," 27 October 1967, AG-OHS; U.S., Department of the Army, "Emergency Employment of Army and Other Resources, Civil Disturbances," (Army Regulation 500-50), 11 June 1969, p. 6.
96. Ohio, 1000-Day Report, p. 27; "AG Speaks," The Ohio Guardsman, 33 (August - October 1967):3.
97. For example, the 371st Artillery Group prepared a special communications plan for implementation in civil disturbances. Commander to all subordinate units, "Aid to Civil Authorities (Signal Equipment)," 27 August 1967, AG-OHS. The Guard presented a special class on civil disturbance control to civilian officials from nine cities over the week-end of 23-24

September 1967. The Ohio Guardsman, 33 (August - October 1967):8. The state headquarters planned to borrow state-owned school buses for emergency movement of troops. Major Clyde E. Gutsweiler to Hostetler, "Use of School Busses to Transport National Guard Troops During Emergencies," 4 August 1967, AG-OHS.

98. Among them were the Continental Army Command, the 1st United States Army, the 82nd Airborne Division, the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), the 1st Air Force Region, the 4th Naval District, Civil Defense Region II, and the 109th Military Intelligence Group. Ohio, AG Report 1969, p. 25.
99. The OARNG received some unexpected praise from the New York Times, which visited the summer training of the 3d Brigade, 37th Infantry Division. The paper called discipline "excellent," noted the brigade's superior record in annual training, and its experience at civil disturbance control. It further noted that the OARNG had made considerable preparations for civil disturbances on its own. Neil Sheehan, "Guardsmen Cope," New York Times, 27 August 1967, p. 3.
100. Yeargen, "Considerations," p. 30; Clem says, "I think that all OARNG officers were determined that we would not have that bad publicity such as had attended the Detroit riots ." Interview with Clem, 10 September 1981.
101. Lemberg Center, "April Aftermath," p. 60; "Riot Reaction," Guardsman, May 1968.
102. Ohio, AG Report 1968, p. 22.
103. Mark Parillo, "Youngstown - Martin Luther King Riots - April 8-10, 1968," (Graduate seminar paper, Ohio State University, 9 June 1981), photocopied.
104. "People," The National Guardsman, May 1968, p. 38.
105. Interview with Del Corso, 1 December 1981. Del Corso specifically expressed his attitude toward the Guard mission, combat training and civil disturbances in his remarks to the 1968 annual conference of the Ohio National Guard Association on 17 May 1968, in the Official Proceedings, p. 61. This attitude was consistent with the Guard's traditional concern with retaining its combat mission as discussed in Derthick, The National Guard, p. 3, and with Del Corso's experience in two wars as a Guardsman. His attitudes were shared by other senior Guard officers, for example,

Major General Wilson of New Jersey. Washington Post, 14 August 1966, p. E-3. Ruvio and Jones confirm the description of Del Corso's leadership style. Interviews, 13 August and 19 August 1981.

106. Ohio National Guard Association, Official Proceedings of the 1968 Annual Conference of the ONGA, 17-18 May 1968, pp. 57-59, 63.
107. Interview with Ruvio, 13 August 1981; Jones, 24 August 1981; Clem, 10 September 1981; Del Corso, 1 December 1981.
108. I have not included the prison incidents in this study because they constitute a special case of civil disturbance which would distract me from my central interest in military operations in a public setting and because, while important, they were minor in comparison to the ghetto and campus disturbances. The OARNG has considerable experience, dating back to the 19th century, at aiding prison authorities during inmate riots, strikes by guards and other emergencies. Prison disturbances to which the OARNG responded between 1965 and 1970 were as follows:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>NUMBER TROOPS</u>
24-30 June 1968	Columbus	701
9 July 1968	London	235
18 Jul-7 Aug 1968	Columbus	508
20 Aug-23 Sep 1968	Columbus	1,625
29-30 April 1969	Columbus	371
29 Apr-1 May 1969	Mansfield	77

Ohio, AG Report 1968, 1969, and 1000-Day Report, p. 2.

109. Louis H. Masotti and Jerome R. Corsi, Shoot-out in Cleveland: Black Militants and the Police - A Report Submitted to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, May 16, 1969 (New York: Frederick A. Praegar, 1970). I have relied heavily on this and John A. Anderson, "The Ohio National Guard in Cleveland, 1968," (Graduate seminar paper, Ohio State University, 9 June 1981), (photocopied) for details of events in Cleveland.
110. It cannot go without comment that Rhodes was at the National Governors' Conference in Cincinnati listening to an address by President Johnson when Stokes reached him. Again, as at Dayton in 1966, Ohio was the scene of unusual employment of the National Guard in relation to civil disturbances while the President was a guest in the state.

111. Interview with Del Corso, 1 December 1981.
112. Ibid. Del Corso's position on the proper use of his troops is perfectly consistent with normal military practice. However, it is doubtful whether there were enough black Guardsmen at Cleveland to make a significant contribution to Stokes' volunteers even if Del Corso had been willing to release them.
113. On August 9, 1968, after the Cleveland riots had subsided, Del Corso, testifying before the Ohio Crime Commission, expressed his disagreement with Stokes' tactics. That was only proper; he had in fact disagreed. At the time the decision to withdraw the Guard was made, however, he publicly supported the mayor, as was his duty. There is no inconsistency in such conduct. Masotti and Corsi, Shoot-out, p. 82; Cleveland Call and Post, 3 August 1968, p. 14A.
114. Masotti and Corsi, Shoot-out, p. xvii.
115. Before Guard troops arrival in Columbus, an unknown sniper shot and killed a bystander with a high-powered rifle, evidence that the threat of sniper fire during civil disturbances was quite real. Columbus Dispatch, 22 July 1969, p. 8A.
116. Ohio, AG Report 1968, p. 26. Again the OARNG anticipated the Army. A requirement for uniform special orders for issue to all troops in a civil disturbance did not become part of army policy until October, 1969. U.S., Department of the Army, Civil Disturbances, (FM 19-15), Change 2, 24 October 1969, pp. 6-2 - 6-2.1.
117. Interview with Ruvio, 13 August 1981; Ruvio to Del Corso, "After Action Report - Ohio Civil Disturbance Training Course," 26 August 1968, AG-OHS; Ohio, AG Report 1968, p. 25; AG Report 1969, p. 26.
118. Ohio, AG Report 1969, p. 25. In fact, an "OPLAN 2" existed prior to May, 1969, but it was a rather cursory outline of alert procedures for civil disturbances or disaster relief missions. OPLAN 2 as published in May, 1969, was a complete revision of the older plan and constituted an entirely new document focused exclusively on civil disturbance.
119. Ohio, Adjutant General's Department, "OPLAN 2: Aid to Civil Authorities," 15 May 1969, pp. 1-5.
120. Ibid., p. 1.

121. Ibid., Appendix F, pp. 2-3.
122. Masotti and Corsi mention the public concern that the Cleveland riots heralded a new, revolutionary phase of the black civil rights movement, pp. viii - ix. Parallels to guerrilla warfare were common even before that, for example, Washington Post, 14 August 1966, Columbus Dispatch, 24 July 1966. The Cuyahoga County Grand Jury believed the riots were the work of professional terror cadres of the Communist Party, Masotti and Corsi, pp. 13-14. The Lemberg Center attributes most of this to sensationalism in the press and specifically denies that sniping was anywhere near as widespread as people believed. Lemberg Center, "Sniping Incidents - A New Pattern of Violence," February 1969, pp. 3-5 and 19-20. It seems reasonable to conclude that the ghetto riots of 1968 and 1969 were of a pattern with those of 1965-67, but were more vigorously exploited by more radical groups, some of whom, such as Evans' New Libyans, were prone to violence. Del Corso recalls that vigilante groups were forming in response to the vitriolic rhetoric of self-styled revolutionaries such as Jerry Rubin and that his office knew some of these were even starting military-like training. Interview with Del Corso, 1 December 1981. Therein lay the real danger: not that they represented a direct revolutionary threat to American government or society, but that they provided an opportunity for extremists of all persuasions to run amok, polarizing popular opinion beyond the reach of reasonable negotiation.
123. Viorst, Fire in the Streets, p. 292. Viorst does a particularly good job tracing the movement of radical thought and action from southern, black, civil rights demonstrations to northern, black and white, campus demonstrations. See also Lemberg Center, "April Aftermath," pp. 15-16, and James F. Coberly, "An Evaluation of Army National Guard Preparedness to Perform Riot Control Functions," (Student paper, U.S. Army War College, 19 February 1968), pp. 26-27.
124. Miscellaneous memos and reports, untitled, appended to 1968 file of Adjutant General records, uncatalogued, at the Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio.
125. Interview with Clem, 10 September 1981.
126. Ibid; interview with Del Corso, 1 December 1981.
127. "OSU Students Voice Opinions," Columbus Dispatch, 8

April 1970, p. 30A. I have based my discussion of events at OSU on my own paper, Paul H. Herbert, "The Ohio Army National Guard and the Other University, 1970," (Graduate Seminar paper, Ohio State University, 9 June 1981).

128. Clem was commander of troops at OSU as of 2 May. He says that he made it clear to university officials that he would not use his troops to break up crowds of students in open areas where they could do no damage, such as the Oval, because of the danger inherent in such a confrontation and because such action could serve no purpose. Whether Clem was the catalyst for the decision or not, it was a wise one from all perspectives. Interview with Clem, 10 September 1981.
129. My account of Kent State is based mostly on two sources: James Michener, Kent State - What Happened and Why (New York: Random House, 1971), and Daniel P. French, "Ohio National Guard Operations During the 1970 Disorders," (Master's Thesis, Ohio State University, 1981).
130. Michener debunks the sniper theory, recites the story of a witness who claims to have heard an order, and seems to rest finally on the notion that the Guardsmen, hot, tired, and scared, agreed among each other to fire, pp. 307-349. French implies that the shooting was a panicked reaction, p. 61. Viorst agrees with Michener that the shooting was pre-arranged among the Guardsmen, pp. 537-38. For an example of the sniper theory, see Alan Stang, "Kent State: Proof to Save the Guardsmen," American Opinion, June, 1974.
131. U.S., Department of the Army, Continental Army Command, "Civil Disturbance Plan (Garden Plot)," 1 May 1969, Annex C, Appendix 5, p. 1.
132. "Rhodes, Taft Clash Over Record," Columbus Citizen-Journal, 22 April 1970, p. 1.
133. The notion is offered by Michener quoting Dean Myron J. Lunine, Honors College, Kent State University, Kent State, p. 232.
134. Interview with Del Corso, 1 December 1981; Ohio, AG Report 1970, pp. 32-34; Michener, Kent State, pp. 116-119.
135. Del Corso to Chief, National Guard Bureau, "Request for Civil Disturbance Equipment and Funding," 8 October

1970 in Del Corso's possession; Ohio, AG Report 1971, pp. 20-21; 1972, p. 26. Del Corso says this letter was the result of a study he initiated well before Kent State, the purpose of which was to reduce the Guard's lethality when committed to a civil disturbance. There is no reason to disbelieve him. Such a thought apparently never occurred to Hostetler, who told Rivers in 1967 that the Guard's only special equipment needs for civil disturbances were armored vehicles for command posts, better radios, and aircraft. Hostetler to Rivers, 7 August 1967. It seems apparent that Kent State was a major impetus to both the submission and approval of the request.

- 136. Interview with Clem, 10 September 1981.
- 137. Michener, Kent State, p. 294.

APPENDIX I
OHIO CIVIL DISTURBANCES 1965 - 1970

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type/Rmks</u>	<u>Number of Troops</u>
1965			
4-5 July	Russell's Point	"teen-age"	544
" " "	Geneva-on-the-Lake	" "	137
1966			
19-31 July	Cleveland	Racial	2215
4-5 July	Geneva-on-the-Lake	Stand by	50
1-7 Sep	Dayton	Racial	1142
1967			
13-18 Jun	Cincinnati	Racial	900
25-30 Jul	Toledo	" /stand by	1115
28-29 Jul	Lorain	" " "	129
13-15 Nov	Central State College	"	922
1968			
8-15 Apr	Cincinnati	Racial	1290
8-11 Apr	Youngstown	"	1314
10 Apr	Columbus (Ohio State U)	Student demo/ stand by	12
20-22 May	Athens (Ohio University)	"	666
24-30 Jun	Columbus (state peni- tentiary)	Prison	701
9 Jul	London	Prison	235
18-25 Jul	Akron	Racial	1254
18 Jul -			
7 Aug	Columbus	Prison	508
24-28 Jul	Cleveland	Racial	2300
" " "	Ohio	Standby	Entire OARNG
20 Aug -			
23 Sep	Columbus	Prison	1625
1969			
29-30 Apr	Columbus	Prison	371
29 Apr -			
1 May	Mansfield	"	77
17-20 Jul	Youngstown	Racial	168
21-24 Jul	Columbus	"	1000
10-11 Dec	Akron (University of Akron)	Student demo/ stand by	700

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type-Rmks</u>	<u>Number of Troops</u>
1970			
8-10 Apr	Cleveland	Racial/stand by	1000
15-17 Apr	Oxford (Miami Univ.)	Student demo/ stand by	500
18-19 Apr	Sandusky	High school inte- gration/stand by	80
29 Apr - 9 May	Columbus (OSU)	Student demo	2500
29 Apr - 5 May	Cleveland, Akron, Cincinnati	Truckers' strike	4000
2-8 May	Kent (Kent State Univ.)	Student demo	1252
15-19 May	Athens (Ohio University)	Student demo/ stand by	2000
20-28 May	Columbus (OSU)	Student demo	4000
6-10 Aug	Lima	Racial	600

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Generally, I have listed secondary sources first and then primary sources by location. Included under each location heading are some published materials which I believe would be very difficult to find anywhere else. I have listed newspaper and magazine articles and the Adjutant General records from the Ohio Historical Society chronologically rather than alphabetically. The AG records at the Ohio Historical Society have not been inventoried or catalogued as of this writing. They are haphazardly stored in eleven book cartons. Therefore, precise locations cannot be cited.

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